The self-referential cordis toolset: three model-facing tools over the live runtime the agent runs inside. Design home — sandbox semantics, mount lifecycle, cross-mount composition, the generated API catalog, standing decisions: [the toolset RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-self-referential-cordis-toolset.md).
-`cordis_inspect` — read-only report over the runtime: services, the loaded-plugin list, registered tools, the dynamic-mount table, and the catalog-backed `api` / `events` references.
-`cordis_mount` — evaluates model-written JavaScript (the body of an async function) in a `node:vm` sandbox; the code must `return` a cordis plugin, which is mounted under the `cordis-dynamic` group fiber and tracked as `dyn-<n>`.
-`cordis_unmount` — disposes one mount by id, returning only after quiescence.
The sandbox isolates the global context only — it is not a security boundary. No Node API is provided: `require`, the timers, and `fetch` are callable traps that throw a redirect to the cordis alternative (`ctx.fs` / `ctx.web` / `ctx.bash` / `inject: ['timer']` + `ctx.setTimeout`); `process` and `Buffer` are `undefined`; `globalThis` writes stay inside. These traps steer honest code onto the cordis services; they do not contain a mount that goes looking — the host-realm helpers on the sandbox global (`harness`, `console`, `btoa`) are reachable functions, so mount code can reach the host realm and Node through one of them, which is fine because `ctx` is fully privileged anyway. The `ctx` a mounted plugin's `apply` receives is a whitelist façade — register tools, observe events, provide/consume services, use timers; framework internals (`ctx.root`, `ctx.fiber`, `ctx.extend`, `ctx.plugin`, …) are withheld — but the capabilities it does expose reach the real runtime, so load this plugin as deliberately as you would grant a bash tool.
| `vmTimeoutMs` | `5000` | Bound on the SYNCHRONOUS portion of mount-code evaluation; an async body escapes it |
## The generated API catalog
`src/api-catalog.ts` is generated by `scripts/gen-cordis-api.ts` from the same AST walk as [docs/cordis-catalog](../../../docs/cordis-catalog/services.md) and freshness-gated by `pnpm run verify-cordis-api` (in `doc-sync`) — never edit it by hand. `cordis_inspect` intersects it with the live service store at call time.
## Rendering
All three tools render `generic` cards (`read` / `execute` / `delete`); `cordis_mount` carries the mount code as `rawInput`. Presenters are pure functions of the args; results keep the default text rendering.
## Export shape
Namespace plugin: named exports `name` / `inject` / `Config` / `apply`, no default export ([docs/postmortem/0001](../../../docs/postmortem/0001-acp-default-export-drops-inject.md)).
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| Tool schemas | The conversation model sees `cordis_inspect`, `cordis_mount`, and `cordis_unmount` whenever this plugin is visible. | Fixed schema cost on every request in that tool view. |
| Tool-call history and results | Inspect joins selected sections exactly as `## <section>` then a newline and the data-dependent body, with one blank line between sections. Mount returns `mounted <id> (plugin "<name>", state: <state>)`, optionally inserting ` — waiting for service(s): <names> (activates when provided)` before the closing parenthesis. Unmount returns `unmounted <id> (plugin "<name>")`; an unknown id becomes `Error: no dynamic plugin with id "<id>" (list mounts with cordis_inspect what:"dynamic")`. The submitted mount program remains in the assistant tool-call history. | Inspect output and mount code are data-dependent and resent until compaction; lifecycle acknowledgements are small. |
| Later requests after a mount | A mounted plugin may register tools, prompt contributions, or listeners that change later requests for the scopes it targets; unmount removes those contributions after quiescence. | Indirect token impact equals the mounted plugin's contributions and lasts only for the mount lifetime. |
- **The sandbox is containment for honest code, not a security boundary** — host-realm helpers on the sandbox global are reachable, so mount code can reach Node; load this plugin as deliberately as you would grant a bash tool (see § Trust stance).
- **The `ctx` façade exposes no `effect()`** — mount code cannot register a bespoke disposer; `on`/`provide`/`tools.register` cover every mount seen so far, and a guarded `effect` waits on a real need (`FIXME(sandbox-effect)`).
- **`vmTimeoutMs` bounds only synchronous evaluation** — an async mount body escapes it; there is no async budget on mount code.
