docs(i18n): refresh core data translations after merge

docs/core-data-structures/sandbox.zh.md

@@ -11,39 +11,90 @@
 `SandboxMode` 仅管控文件系统效果。`read-only` 拒绝所有写入（必需的 `/dev/null` 接收器除外）；`workspace-write` 允许在工作区根目录及后端承诺的临时区域下写入；`danger-full-access` 绕过隔离。网络与进程可见性不在此处的定义范围内。
 
 ```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * File-effect policy for confined processes. `read-only` permits only required
+ * sinks such as `/dev/null`; `workspace-write` also permits the workspace and a
+ * backend-defined temp area; `danger-full-access` bypasses confinement. Network
+ * and process visibility are outside this vocabulary.
+ */
 type SandboxMode = 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access'
 ```
 
 只有前两种模式可以发送给提供方。`danger-full-access` 的消费方直接 spawn 原始 argv，不调用 `ctx.sandbox`。
 
 ```ts type-equiv
+/** A confining (non-`danger-full-access`) mode — the modes a {@link SandboxPolicy} can carry. */
 type ConfinedSandboxMode = Exclude<SandboxMode, 'danger-full-access'>
 ```
 
 强制执行程度是一个报告事实。`full` 表示后端管控了该模式承诺的所有文件效果；`partial` 表示活跃后端或较旧的内核 ABI 仅管控其中一个子集，因此要求绝对保证的消费方必须拒绝或向上暴露这一区别。
 
 ```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * Enforcement completeness for this host. `partial` means an active backend or
+ * older kernel ABI cannot govern every promised file effect; callers requiring
+ * an absolute boundary must not treat it as `full`.
+ */
 type SandboxEnforcement = 'full' | 'partial'
 ```
 
 ## 逐调用策略
 
-策略在每次调用时完全解析并随调用携带。这使得并发消费方和一次性提权重试能够向同一个提供方请求不同的边界，而无需修改提供方状态。
+完整执行策略会按每次能力调用解析并携带。它包括 `danger-full-access`，因此消费方可以只解析一次策略，再决定是否绕过约束。普通工具调用从调用 session 的不可变 cwd 派生 `workspaceRoot`；部署配置是没有 agent 时的回退值。root 会先按文件系统语义规范化，再做词法规范化，因此包含 `symlink/..` 的 cwd 会标识所生成进程实际运行的目录。
 
 ```ts type-equiv
-interface SandboxPolicy {
+/**
+ * The complete file-effect policy resolved for one capability call. The root
+ * is carried even under modes that do not consume it so callers can resolve
+ * policy once before choosing the enforcement path.
+ */
+interface SandboxExecutionPolicy {
   /** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
-  mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
+  mode: SandboxMode
   /** Absolute root directory `workspace-write` may write under. */
   workspaceRoot: string
 }
 ```
 
+`ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()` 接收活跃 session；对于已批准的重试，还接收显式模式。该服务拥有优先级与 root 回退规则，使 bash 和 fs 不必重复实现。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/** Inputs that select the sandbox policy for one capability call. */
+interface SandboxPolicyRequest {
+  /** Calling session; its immutable cwd becomes the workspace boundary. */
+  session?: Session
+  /** Explicit approved mode override, which outranks session policy. */
+  mode?: SandboxMode
+}
+```
+
+只有受约束的执行会到达 `ctx.sandbox`；其提供方策略在保留同一 root 的同时收窄模式。这使并发 session、消费方与一次性提权重试可以向同一提供方请求不同边界，而无需改变提供方状态。
+
+```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * What one confined execution is allowed to touch — carried PER CALL, not
+ * fixed on the provider: two consumers may confine under different policies
+ * at the same instant (bash under `read-only` while a confined child agent
+ * needs its state directory writable), and an approved escalated retry is a
+ * new call with a wider policy. Defaulting/resolution is an explicit step at
+ * the consumer boundary; the provider treats the policy as fully specified.
+ */
+interface SandboxPolicy extends SandboxExecutionPolicy {
+  /** The file-effect mode this execution runs under. */
+  mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
+}
+```
+
 ## 包装后的 argv 与分类方言
 
 `ConfinedArgv` 是消费方实际 spawn 的内容。除了替换后的 argv，它还携带后端的强制执行事实和两种正交的 stderr 方言。`denialSignatures` 用于识别沙箱正常工作时被隔离命令被阻止的情况。`runnerFailureSignatures` 用于识别沙箱运行器在执行命令之前拒绝或失败的情况；消费方应先检查后者，将其作为沙箱基础设施故障上报，而非普通任务失败。
 
 ```ts type-equiv
+/**
+ * A {@link SandboxProvider.confine} result: the argv to spawn in place of
+ * the caller's own, plus the enforcement completeness the selected backend
+ * achieves for it.
+ */
 interface ConfinedArgv {
   /** The wrapped argv (runner, profile, separator, then the caller's argv). */
   argv: string[]
@@ -59,17 +110,9 @@ interface ConfinedArgv {
    */
   denialSignatures: readonly string[]
   /**
-   * How the RUNNER ITSELF failing identifies itself: case-insensitive stderr
-   * substrings produced when the sandbox binary is missing, refuses its
-   * profile, or fails closed before exec'ing the command (`bwrap: `,
-   * `landlock-run: `, `sandbox-exec: ` — each covers both the runner's own
-   * error prefix and the shell's runner-not-found message). ORTHOGONAL to
-   * {@link denialSignatures}: a denial is the confined COMMAND being blocked
-   * (the sandbox working as designed); a runner failure means the command
-   * NEVER RAN and must surface as a sandbox failure, not a task failure —
-   * consumers check these signatures FIRST (a runner's own error text may
-   * contain denial words, e.g. an unopenable grant root reporting
-   * `Permission denied`).
+   * Case-insensitive signatures for runner failure before command execution.
+   * Consumers check these before denial signatures: runner failure means the
+   * command never ran, while denial means confinement worked and blocked it.
    */
   runnerFailureSignatures: readonly string[]
 }