fix(sandbox): extend the restricted token's default DACL with a write-SID ACE

New objects created without an explicit security descriptor take
their DACL from the token's default DACL, which CreateRestrictedToken
builds from the user's ambient SIDs — none of them a restricting SID.
Confined children therefore failed the write pass-2 check when
creating anonymous pipes (CreatePipe: ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED, surfaced
as Node EPERM), breaking PowerShell pipelines and other CreatePipe
consumers. Merge a full-access write-SID ACE (Everyone under
read-only) into the token default DACL at init via
SetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl).

Named pipes are EXEMPT: their default security descriptor is the
kernel's PUBLIC template (owner/SYSTEM/Admins full, Everyone
read-only), which no token change influences, so libuv's piped stdio
capture stays denied for confined grandchildren — the POC-documented
boundary, now pinned by the runner suite (inherit/ignore OK, pipe
DENIED) and documented in the README pair. The NUL paragraph is
corrected to the measured matrix (Everyone has 0x1201BF on the
device: cmd/node writes land; Set-Content fails at the PS layer).

packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
 #   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/sandbox/sandbox-windows-acl/README.md
-README.md: 3185510142750178b11c2f6bad863a0a4861a29c
-README.zh.md: ab45d29c7dea79c8a75ac2187140e5926cf71581
+README.md: 835b7dace0baf10eec78b35172109a37688d99c2
+README.zh.md: 82a890d75f857b766c7ae47cef7a374edb5ecd63