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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/session-scoped-sandbox-roots

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# Conflicts:
#	.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.i18n.yaml
#	.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md
#	.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md
#	examples/acp-agent/README.md
#	packages/examples/agent-spine-demo/package.json
#	packages/fs/fs-sandbox/src/index.ts
#	packages/fs/tool-fs-search/tests/tools.spec.ts
#	packages/support/acp-snapshot/README.md
#	packages/support/acp-snapshot/src/suite.ts
#	pnpm-lock.yaml
#	scripts/type-equiv.manifest.json
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Tianyi Cui
2026-07-22 21:37:30 +08:00
parent aaee0c0c22 402f8c5f5a
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packages/fs/fs-sandbox/README.md
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@@ -9,14 +9,14 @@ Loading it INSTEAD OF `dsh-fs-local`, together with a [`ctx.sandboxPolicy`](../.
The per-call policy carries the effective mode (session override or escalation grant) together with the calling session's immutable cwd root, falling back to deployment policy only for calls without one:
- `read-only` — denies every mutation with the structured `FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`.
- `workspace-write` — allows a mutation only when the target canonicalizes under a writable root: the workspace root plus the platform temp areas (`/tmp`, `os.tmpdir()`), the SAME set the Seatbelt profile grants, derived from the one [`writableRoots`](../../sandbox/README.md) function so the fs fence and the bash runner cannot drift. The target is re-canonicalized immediately before delegating, so an ancestor symlink swapped since the tool resolved it is caught.
- `workspace-write` — allows a mutation only when the target canonicalizes under a writable root: the workspace root plus the platform temp areas (`/tmp`, `os.tmpdir()`), the SAME set the Seatbelt profile grants, derived from the one [`writableRoots`](../../sandbox/README.md) function so the fs fence and the bash runner cannot drift. Canonical spellings use a lexical fast path; an identity-based ancestor fallback recognizes alias-equivalent roots such as Windows long names and 8.3 names without treating unrelated prefixes as contained. The target is re-canonicalized immediately before delegating, so an ancestor symlink swapped since the tool resolved it is caught.
- `danger-full-access` — delegates unfenced.
## Threat model: a policy fence, not a kernel boundary
The fence is a check in TRUSTED code over a MODEL-CONTROLLED path — the operations are the seam's own (open, rename), only the target path is untrusted, so canonicalize-then-contain is the complete answer to this surface. This mirrors the `code-runtime` stance: containment, not a security boundary. Kernel-grade isolation of untrusted CODE stays `ctx.bash`'s job ([`dsh-bash-sandbox`](../../bash/bash-sandbox/README.md)). The residual TOCTOU (an ancestor symlink swapped between the containment re-check and the syscall) is narrowed by re-canonicalizing immediately before the write and is accepted for this threat model; a kernel-tight boundary needs `openat2`-class primitives not worth their portability cost here.
A denial is a structured `FsError` (`FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`, carrying the effective mode) — no stderr text inference (unlike bash's kernel denials), because an in-process fence knows exactly what it refused. The model-facing `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker and the one-approved-wider retry live in the tool layer (`dsh-tool-fs`), exactly as bash's do. See [the cross-family fs sandbox RFC](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md).
A denial is a structured `FsError` (`FS_SANDBOX_DENIED`, carrying the effective mode) — no stderr text inference (unlike bash's kernel denials), because an in-process fence knows exactly what it refused. The model-facing `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker and the one-approved-wider retry live in the tool layer (`dsh-tool-fs`), exactly as bash's do. See [the cross-family fs sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md).
## Model Experience