Merge branch 'worktree/web-carrier-chain' into worktree/web-ask-user-question

Restack the ask-user domain layer onto the carrier-chain architecture
branch. Conflict policy: runtime and ui-conversation take the
carrier-chain side (master sessions shape, dual-kind PendingCard,
'internal' envelope shell tests); the 'cancelled' wire code and its
semantics tests stay in apiproxy + ui-question (domain layer); the
smoke fixture keeps the nine-bundle success pass with the resident
question round over the carrier-chain first-describe shape.
This commit is contained in:
imccyu
2026-07-23 18:50:30 +08:00
141 changed files with 5200 additions and 2360 deletions
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ The lifecycle has two distinct classes of content. The initial applicable chain
## Decision
The implementation lives in `packages/context/workspace-context` as `@deepseek-ai/dsh-workspace-context`. It is a request-context extension, not a core service or a filesystem backend. `@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-core` mounts it for both product front doors and forwards its config. The plugin consumes `agent/session-prefix`, `tools/post-execute`, and the optional `ctx.fs` capability.
The implementation lives in `packages/context/workspace-context` as `@deepseek-ai/dsh-workspace-context`. It is a request-context extension, not a core service or a filesystem backend. The shared demo spine and Host Runtime mount it from an explicit `{ maxBytes } | false` deployment choice; `dsh web` enables a 65,536-byte budget while the Host Runtime's headless consumer disables it. The plugin consumes `agent/session-prefix`, `tools/post-execute`, and the optional `ctx.fs` capability.
The plugin does not statically inject `fs`. Providerless product trees therefore boot normally and the plugin no-ops until a filesystem provider exists. All production reads go through that provider. Candidate probes resolve each path and stat the result, so a final-component symlink is followed to its target: a link to a regular file loads, while a missing path or a non-file target is a confirmed absence. Following repository-owned links across the trust boundary is a deliberate reversal of the original no-follow probe; the [instruction-symlink follow note](2026-07-21-follow-instruction-symlinks.md) owns that decision and its residual risk. The session-prefix signal and dynamic tool execution signal propagate through resolution, metadata probes, and streaming reads, so cancellation does not wait for an unrelated filesystem scan. A resolve or stat exception is classified as unavailable: it skips only that candidate and is never interpreted as the deletion of an already-loaded scope.
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ There is intentionally no watcher. Detection occurs at the next successful struc
## Consequences
Workspace guidance is isolated per session and shared by both product front doors and every tool presentation mode. Initial instructions benefit from stable prefix caching, while nested and changed content remains durable and replayable. The generic session/agent context contract carries JSON metadata propagated through prompt-submit and post-tool `additionalContexts` arrays without flattening entries.
Workspace guidance is isolated per session and shared by the demo front doors, Web Host, and every tool presentation mode. Initial instructions benefit from stable prefix caching, while nested and changed content remains durable and replayable. The generic session/agent context contract carries JSON metadata propagated through prompt-submit and post-tool `additionalContexts` arrays without flattening entries.
Repository text remains untrusted input. Lower-authority user-role framing, explicit precedence language, and delimiter escaping reduce risk but do not eliminate prompt injection. Following a candidate symlink to its target widens that surface to off-tree content, so the permission and sandbox layers that confine `ctx.fs` to trusted roots are the boundary that treats workspace files as data rather than authority (the [instruction-symlink follow note](2026-07-21-follow-instruction-symlinks.md) owns the residual risk).
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ fs/web/todo execute in-process, so their sandbox semantics are policy at their s
- **Unit:** pin platform selection and profiles, fail-closed runner classification, per-call mode/root resolution, per-process facts, escalation validation and outcomes, permission preset folding and write-through, narrator coalescing, ACP advertisement and validation, and turn-enclosed config writes.
- **Keyless real-runner:** exercise bwrap, Landlock, and Seatbelt against real filesystem effects at provider and bash-consumer layers; one real Cordis context concurrently drives two project sessions through shipped bash and fs tools, proving own-root success and sibling-root denial. Packed-install coverage proves the registry launcher remains executable. The real ACP composition pins permission switching and rejects unknown presets. CI rejects a silent all-skip.
- **With-key:** drive a real model, runner, bridge answerer, and disk effect through granted and rejected escalation; unavailable credentials or runners self-skip.
- **With-key:** start the real ACP composition in read-only mode, let a model-driven bash write hit the runner's denial marker, then drive the bridge answerer and disk effect through granted and rejected workspace-write retries; unavailable credentials or runners self-skip.
- **Snapshot:** pin the permission config-option wire, preset and knob events, prompt deltas and notices, and both scripted approval branches. A real ACP example scenario places its session under the user home while the deployment fallback points at `/tmp`, then pins a successful workspace-write mutation; this distinguishes session-root resolution from the process fallback without depending on runner-specific denial text. Other snapshots start unconfined so unrelated fixtures remain platform-independent, and policy scenarios switch explicitly.
## Deferred phases
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
2026-07-20-dsh-cli-personal-config.md: e349374a6bc7fc0137bf14836469aef8bae8d49d
2026-07-20-dsh-cli-personal-config.zh.md: 88210dc386a245002de927950dab2852e40218ea
2026-07-20-dsh-cli-personal-config.md: 514bb5b12a3e04c7deaad1e8616472eed1c920e1
2026-07-20-dsh-cli-personal-config.zh.md: 16fada82c59c8a356e6df112234e6b7565aae1bf
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ Two coupled pieces, aligned with the `apps/` assembly tier proposed by the `dsh
The PTY smoke's launcher isolates `$DSH_HOME` to a per-test directory, exactly as it already isolates `DSH_AGENTS_HOME`, so a developer's real personal overlay cannot leak into fixtures; only the dsh CLI reads personal config, so no other test launcher needed changes.
Hot-reload interplay: the include re-applies its `patches` on every config re-read (the [config hot-reload resilience Agent Note](../bug-fix/2026-07-20-config-hot-reload-resilience.md)), so a live `cordis.yml` edit keeps the personal overlay applied.
## Alternatives considered
**A standalone `bin/dsh` wrapper owning the `dsh` name.** Rejected after reading PR #443: that PR establishes `apps/cli` as the `dsh` CLI with subcommand dispatch (`web`, `-p`) and leaves the default slot unclaimed. Two competing `dsh` entrypoints would collide in `$PATH` and in product identity; claiming the default slot inside the same package shape confines the eventual merge conflict to the small dispatch chain.
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ Status: implemented
PTY 冒烟测试的启动器把 `$DSH_HOME` 隔离到每个测试自己的目录,与它已有的 `DSH_AGENTS_HOME` 隔离方式完全一致,开发者真实的个人 overlay 不可能泄漏进 fixture;只有 dsh CLI 读取个人配置,因此其他测试启动器无需改动。
与热重载的交互:include 在每次配置重读时重新应用其 `patches`(见[配置热重载韧性 Agent Note](../bug-fix/2026-07-20-config-hot-reload-resilience.md)),因此运行中编辑 `cordis.yml` 后个人 overlay 仍保持生效。
## Alternatives considered
**独立的 `bin/dsh` 包装脚本占有 `dsh` 这个名字。** 读过 PR #443 后否决:该 PR 把 `apps/cli` 确立为带子命令分发(`web``-p`)的 `dsh` CLI,并且默认位空缺。两个互相竞争的 `dsh` 入口会在 `$PATH` 和产品身份上冲突;在同一包形态内认领默认位,把最终的合并冲突限制在小小的分发链上。
@@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
2026-07-21-tui-reload-command.md: de9a5502214a610d88024730b1c0c1044a396c92
2026-07-21-tui-reload-command.zh.md: 25d1d448459221698ca63377f8f18d05a0fa3d21
2026-07-21-tui-reload-command.md: e5600f0ab5cd82dc556df76006fcf532d8c7d302
2026-07-21-tui-reload-command.zh.md: 3798b0518df1c379cca808bd4af38490016567cb
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ HMR's file watcher only reacts to in-place `change` events under its configured
## Decision
`dsh-tui` gains an **experimental, dev-only** `/reload` slash command: it walks `ctx.loader.entries()` and calls `refresh()` on every file-backed subtree (`Include`), i.e. the exact code path the HMR watcher's config-change branch drives, invoked manually and watcher-independent. Unchanged files are no-ops (content comparison in `Include.read`).
`dsh-tui` gains an **experimental, dev-only** `/reload` slash command: it walks `ctx.loader.entries()` and calls `refresh()` on every file-backed subtree (`Include`), i.e. the exact code path the HMR watcher's config-change branch drives, invoked manually and watcher-independent. Unchanged files are no-ops (content comparison in `Include.read`); invalid files warn and keep the running tree (the hot-reload-resilience contract); include `patches` — including the dsh CLI's personal overlay — re-apply on every re-read.
The TUI reaches the Loader **structurally** (`ctx.loader` via a local type, not `inject`): tests and embedders run the TUI without a Loader, where `/reload` degrades to a warning notice instead of failing the mount. Module-source hot reload stays watcher-owned; `/reload` refreshes configs only.
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ The TUI reaches the Loader **structurally** (`ctx.loader` via a local type, not
- The command reports tree count and completion as transcript notices; per-file failures surface only in loader logs, which the TUI does not display — acceptable for a dev-only surface, noted in the completion message.
- A re-entrancy guard serializes reloads: `/reload` while one is in flight is refused with a warning, keeping the loader's unmutexed tree-update pass single-writer; the guard releases on completion or failure.
- `/reload` runs only while the agent is idle: a reload can dispose and re-mount entries, which under an active turn could tear tools or the adapter out from under in-flight calls. The check is advisory (a send can race in after it) but removes the common footgun.
- If any `refresh()` rejects, the command reports the failure instead of leaving an unhandled rejection.
- If `refresh()`'s never-reject contract ever changes, the command reports the failure instead of leaving an unhandled rejection.
## Testing
`packages/ui/tui/tests/tui.spec.ts` pins: `/reload` refreshes every file-backed subtree and skips plain entries (structural fake Loader), reports completion, refuses re-entry while a gated refresh is in flight and runs again after release, releases the guard on the failure arm, refuses a running agent and runs again at idle, reports a rejecting refresh, and degrades to a warning without a Loader — including mounted as a real plugin fiber, where a throwing service lookup would escape. Verified live in tmux against the real tree: a probe edit reloads successfully.
`packages/ui/tui/tests/tui.spec.ts` pins: `/reload` refreshes every file-backed subtree and skips plain entries (structural fake Loader), reports completion, refuses re-entry while a gated refresh is in flight and runs again after release, releases the guard on the failure arm, refuses a running agent and runs again at idle, reports a rejecting refresh, and degrades to a warning without a Loader — including mounted as a real plugin fiber, where a throwing service lookup would escape. Verified live in tmux against the real tree: probe edit reload applies; invalid edit → reload keeps the running tree.
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ HMR 的文件监听器只对其配置根目录(示例中即配置叶子所在
## Decision
`dsh-tui` 增加一个**实验性、仅供开发**的 `/reload` 斜杠命令:遍历 `ctx.loader.entries()`,对每个文件后端的子树(`Include`)调用 `refresh()`——即 HMR 监听器配置变更分支所走的同一条代码路径,改为手动触发、不依赖监听器。未变化的文件是无操作(`Include.read` 做内容比较)。
`dsh-tui` 增加一个**实验性、仅供开发**的 `/reload` 斜杠命令:遍历 `ctx.loader.entries()`,对每个文件后端的子树(`Include`)调用 `refresh()`——即 HMR 监听器配置变更分支所走的同一条代码路径,改为手动触发、不依赖监听器。未变化的文件是无操作(`Include.read` 做内容比较);无效文件记录警告并保留运行中的树(热重载韧性契约);include 的 `patches`——包括 dsh CLI 的个人 overlay——在每次重读时重新应用
TUI 以**结构方式**访问 Loader(通过局部类型访问 `ctx.loader`,而非 `inject`):测试和嵌入方在没有 Loader 的情况下运行 TUI,此时 `/reload` 退化为一条警告通知而不是挂载失败。模块源码热重载仍由监听器负责;`/reload` 只刷新配置。
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ TUI 以**结构方式**访问 Loader(通过局部类型访问 `ctx.loader`
- 命令以 transcript 通知报告树数量与完成;单文件失败只出现在 loader 日志里,TUI 不显示——对仅供开发的表面可以接受,完成消息中已注明。
- 重入保护串行化重载:前一次进行中时 `/reload` 会被拒绝并提示警告,使 loader 无互斥的树更新过程保持单写者;保护在完成或失败时释放。
- `/reload` 只在 agent 空闲时运行:重载可能卸载并重新挂载配置项,在活跃轮次下这会把工具或适配器从进行中的调用脚下抽掉。检查是建议性的(检查后仍可能有 send 竞争进来),但消除了常见的坑。
- 任一 `refresh()` reject,命令会报告失败而不是留下未处理的 rejection。
- `refresh()` 的永不 reject 契约将来改变,命令会报告失败而不是留下未处理的 rejection。
## Testing
`packages/ui/tui/tests/tui.spec.ts` 固定:`/reload` 刷新每个文件后端子树并跳过普通配置项(结构化的假 Loader)、报告完成、在门控的刷新进行中拒绝重入并在释放后可再次运行、失败分支同样释放保护、拒绝运行中的 agent 并在空闲后可再次运行、报告 reject 的 refresh、无 Loader 时退化为警告——包括作为真实插件 fiber 挂载的情形,在那里会抛出的服务查找会泄露出去。已在 tmux 中对真实配置树实机验证:探针编辑 reload 成功生效。
`packages/ui/tui/tests/tui.spec.ts` 固定:`/reload` 刷新每个文件后端子树并跳过普通配置项(结构化的假 Loader)、报告完成、在门控的刷新进行中拒绝重入并在释放后可再次运行、失败分支同样释放保护、拒绝运行中的 agent 并在空闲后可再次运行、报告 reject 的 refresh、无 Loader 时退化为警告——包括作为真实插件 fiber 挂载的情形,在那里会抛出的服务查找会泄露出去。已在 tmux 中对真实配置树实机验证:探针编辑 reload 生效;无效编辑 → reload 保留运行中的树