Merge branch 'codex/simp-prune-tools-prompt-surface' into codex/simp-prune-code-runtime-surface

# Conflicts: # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-15-code-mode.md
2026-07-14 19:05:23 +08:00
parent 3707aaa72e 32ed403500
commit 59c5010283
562 changed files with 4440 additions and 12566 deletions
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{"protocolVersion":1,"agentInfo":{"name":"deepseek-harness-acp","version":"0.0.1"},"agentCapabilities":{"loadSession":true,"promptCapabilities":{"image":false,"audio":false,"embeddedContext":false}},"authMethods":[]}}
-{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","configOptions":[{"id":"permission","name":"Permissions","description":"The session permission preset: each choice bundles a sandbox mode and an approval policy.","category":"mode","type":"select","currentValue":"danger-full-access","options":[{"value":"workspace-write","name":"workspace-write","description":"Write inside the workspace; anything wider asks for your approval."},{"value":"danger-full-access","name":"danger-full-access","description":"Full file access, no approval prompts."}]}]}}
+{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","configOptions":[{"id":"permission","name":"Permissions","description":"Sets this session's sandbox and approval behavior.","category":"mode","type":"select","currentValue":"danger-full-access","options":[{"value":"workspace-write","name":"workspace-write","description":"Write inside the workspace and permitted temporary directories; wider retries require approval."},{"value":"danger-full-access","name":"danger-full-access","description":"Full file access without approval prompts."}]}]}}
 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":"The"}}}}
 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" user"}}}}
 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{"sessionId":"{{sessionId}}","update":{"sessionUpdate":"agent_thought_chunk","content":{"type":"text","text":" wants"}}}}
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ The available tools:

 ```ts
 declare const tools: {
-  /** Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way (a background task reports the same marker via bash_output once it has finished). Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`. Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command IS denied and a wider mode would let it succeed, escalate immediately in the SAME turn — the ONE sanctioned exception to a denial: retry the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the approval prompt raised by that retry IS how the user consents. If the session states approval prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one THIS command just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. A rejected escalation is final for THAT command — stop and explain, never work around it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later. */
+  /** Execute a bash command (`bash -c`) and return its stdout/stderr. Each call runs in a fresh shell: no state (cwd, variables, functions) persists between calls — pass `workdir` instead of using `cd`. Non-zero exits are reported as `[exit code: N]`. Commands may run under a file sandbox; a blocked file operation is reported as `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` — a policy denial, not a bug in the command; do not retry another way (a background task reports the same marker via bash_output once it has finished). Long output is truncated to its tail; the full output is saved to a file whose path is reported when available. Set `run_in_background: true` for long-running commands: the call returns a task id immediately; poll it with `bash_output` and stop it with `bash_kill`. Attempting a command the sandbox may deny is safe and expected: run it and read the marker rather than assuming the denial. When a command is denied and a wider mode would let it succeed, escalate immediately in the same turn — the one sanctioned exception to a denial: retry the exact same command once with `sandbox_permissions` (the narrowest wider mode that suffices) plus a one-sentence `justification`. Do not detour through chat to ask permission first — the approval prompt raised by that retry is how the user consents. If the session states approval prompts are disabled, there is no exception: a denial is final — do not set `sandbox_permissions`. Never escalate speculatively: ground the request in a real denial — normally the one this command just hit; escalating up front is fine only when this session already denied the same access. A rejected escalation is final for that command — stop and explain, never work around it — but it does not forbid attempting or escalating other commands later. */
  bash(args: {
    /** The bash command to execute. */
    command: string;