Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/rfc-subagent-background-tasks
# Conflicts: # docs/config-catalog.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/core-data-structures/bash.md # docs/core-data-structures/core.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/tool-catalog.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/both-mode-turn/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/code-mode-turn/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/text-turn/session.jsonl # packages/README.md # packages/bash/README.md # packages/bash/bash-local/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash/README.md # packages/bash/bash/package.json # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/bash/src/types.ts # packages/bash/bash/tests/service.spec.ts # packages/bash/bash/tsconfig.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/README.md # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tsconfig.json # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/core/agent-core/README.md # packages/core/agent-core/package.json # packages/core/agent-core/src/index.ts # packages/core/agent-core/tests/agent-core.spec.ts # packages/core/tools/tests/gen-tool-catalog.spec.ts # packages/hooks/hook-protocol/tests/runner.spec.ts # packages/ui/acp-agent/tests/acp-agent.spec.ts # packages/ui/stdio-agent/tests/stdio-agent.spec.ts # pnpm-lock.yaml # scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json # scripts/gen-tool-catalog.ts
This commit is contained in:
Yichen Jiang
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/**
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* `SandboxBashExecutor`: the sandbox-consuming implementation of the
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* `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash` executor seam. Every spawned command is wrapped by
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* the `ctx.sandbox` provider (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox`) according to the
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* configured {@link SandboxMode}: the executor hands the provider the exact
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* `['bash', '-c', command]` argv it is about to spawn and spawns the wrapped
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* argv instead. WHICH platform runner confines it — and whether one is
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* usable at all (the provider fails CLOSED with a structured
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* `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error rather than passing the argv through) — is the
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* provider's concern (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local` first).
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*
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* Extends `LocalBashExecutor` so all process mechanics — spawn, process-group
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* kills, timeout escalation, output collection and spill files, background
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* tasks, the credential scrub — are the local implementation's, verbatim.
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* This package adds only the seam consumption and the result facts, which is
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* exactly the split the capability seam was designed for (a sandboxing
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* executor replaces `dsh-bash-local` without touching `dsh-tool-bash`, and
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* swapping the confinement backend never touches this package).
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*
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* A failed run whose stderr carries the selected backend's own denial
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* dialect (the signatures the provider stamps on every wrap) is classified
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* as a sandbox denial on `BashRunResult.sandbox`, and every confined result
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* also carries how completely the selected runner enforces the mode
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* (`sandbox.enforcement`, from the provider's wrap). A failure carrying the
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* backend's RUNNER-FAILURE signature instead means the sandbox itself broke
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* and the command never ran: the foreground path re-throws it as the
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* structured fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error (late twin of the
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* provider's confine-time throw), a settled background task stamps
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* `sandbox.runnerFailed` — either way a broken sandbox can never read as a
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* failing command, and the command never slips through unconfined.
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*
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* Deny-only at the seam, escalation at the tool: a denial is a reported FACT
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* here, and the one-shot user-approved escalated retry of a denied action
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* (docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md) is driven by
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* `dsh-tool-bash` through `ctx.approval` — this executor's contribution is the
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* per-call `sandboxMode` override it honors in {@link resolve}: an escalated
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* call runs (and classifies, and reports) under ITS granted mode while every
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* neighboring call keeps its session's standing mode (or the configured
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* default when that session has no override).
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*
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* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox
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*/
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import { resolve } from 'node:path'
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import { Context } from 'cordis'
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import z from 'schemastery'
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import type { BashExecRequest, BashExecSpec, BashProcess, BashRunResult } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash'
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import { SandboxUnavailableError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
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import type { ConfinedSandboxMode, SandboxEnforcement, SandboxMode } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox'
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import { LocalBashExecutor } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
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import type { Config as LocalConfig } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
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import type { RunningBash } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
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/**
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* Plugin config: the local executor's knobs plus the sandbox policy. All
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* optional — `static Config` supplies the defaults (`mode: 'read-only'` is the
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* fail-safe default; an example that wants a workspace-writable agent opts in
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* explicitly). The runner choice is NOT configured here: which platform
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* backend confines the command is the `ctx.sandbox` provider's config.
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*/
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export interface Config extends LocalConfig {
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/** File-sandbox mode commands run under (default: `read-only`). */
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mode?: SandboxMode
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/**
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* Root directory `workspace-write` mode may write under (default: the
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* executor's default working directory — `cwd`, else `process.cwd()`).
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*/
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workspaceRoot?: string
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}
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/**
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* Quote one string as a single-quoted POSIX shell word (embedded single
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* quotes become `'\''`), so a wrapped argv element survives the outer
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* `bash -c` re-parse byte-for-byte.
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* @param text - the raw argv element to quote.
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* @returns the single-quoted shell word.
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*/
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export function shellQuote(text: string): string {
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return `'${text.replaceAll("'", String.raw`'\''`)}'`
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}
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/**
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* Conservative sandbox-denial classifier: a run counts as denied only when it
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* FAILED (nonzero exit — a signal kill is not a denial) and its stderr
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* carries one of the SELECTED BACKEND's own denial signatures — the dialect
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* the provider stamps on every wrap (`ConfinedArgv.denialSignatures`:
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* `Read-only file system` under bwrap's EROFS mounts, `Permission denied`
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* under Landlock's EACCES, `Operation not permitted` under Seatbelt's
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* EPERM). Matching the backend's dialect rather than a cross-backend union
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* keeps the classifier from claiming denials the active backend never
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* produces (bare EPERM text under a Linux runner names non-file boundaries —
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* mount, kill, ptrace — that fail the same way unsandboxed). Text inference
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* is the fallback signal until a runner provides a structured one (which
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* wins once it exists); it errs toward NOT claiming a denial, and its known
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* residual imprecision is non-sandbox text in the active dialect (an ssh
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* auth failure reads as a denial under Landlock, a refused `kill` under
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* Seatbelt).
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* @param result - the settled foreground run to classify.
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* @param signatures - the active wrap's denial dialect, case-insensitive
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* stderr substrings.
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* @returns whether the run's failure reads as a sandbox denial.
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*/
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export function classifyDenial(result: BashRunResult, signatures: readonly string[]): boolean {
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return matchesSignature(result.exitCode, result.stderr.text, signatures)
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}
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/**
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* Runner-failure classifier: a failed run whose stderr carries the SELECTED
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* BACKEND's own runner-failure signature (`ConfinedArgv.
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* runnerFailureSignatures`: the runner's error prefix, which also matches
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* the shell's runner-not-found message) means the SANDBOX itself failed and
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* the command never ran. Checked BEFORE {@link classifyDenial} — a runner's
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* error text can contain denial words (an unopenable grant root reports
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* `Permission denied`) — and surfaced as the fail-closed
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* `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error on the foreground path, `sandbox.runnerFailed`
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* on a settled background task. Same conservative-text-inference stance and
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* residual imprecision as the denial classifier (a failing task that itself
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* prints the runner's prefix reads as a runner failure).
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* @param result - the settled foreground run to classify.
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* @param signatures - the active wrap's runner-failure signatures,
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* case-insensitive stderr substrings.
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* @returns whether the run's failure reads as the runner itself failing.
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*/
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export function classifyRunnerFailure(result: BashRunResult, signatures: readonly string[]): boolean {
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return matchesSignature(result.exitCode, result.stderr.text, signatures)
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}
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/**
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* The classifier core shared by foreground results and settled background
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* tasks: failed AND signature present. Lowercases BOTH sides — the seam
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* declares its signatures case-insensitive, and producers compose them from
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* runtime data of any case (an `argv0` path, `No such file or directory`).
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*/
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function matchesSignature(exitCode: number | null, stderr: string, signatures: readonly string[]): boolean {
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if (exitCode === null || exitCode === 0) return false
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const lowered = stderr.toLowerCase()
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return signatures.some(signature => lowered.includes(signature.toLowerCase()))
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}
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/**
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* Sandbox-consuming bash executor. Registers as `ctx.bash` (loading it
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* INSTEAD OF `dsh-bash-local`, together with a `ctx.sandbox` provider, is
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* the whole swap — the tool layer is untouched). Its configured mode is the
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* fallback exposed by {@link sandboxMode}; `dsh-tool-bash` folds a session's
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* durable `bash/sandbox-mode` override and stamps the effective mode onto each
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* request, while an approved escalation may stamp a strictly wider mode for
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* one call. The tool's per-agent prompt section states that same effective
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* mode, and each run's `result.sandbox` reports what actually executed plus
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* enforcement completeness.
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*/
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export class SandboxBashExecutor extends LocalBashExecutor {
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static inject = ['sandbox']
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// The sandbox-specific fields intersect the local executor's Config as an
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// inline schema call: the config catalog walks `static Config` statically.
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static override Config: z<Config> = z.intersect([
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LocalBashExecutor.Config,
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z.object({
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mode: z.union(['read-only', 'workspace-write', 'danger-full-access'] as const).default('read-only'),
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workspaceRoot: z.string(),
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}),
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])
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private readonly mode: SandboxMode
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private readonly workspaceRoot: string
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/**
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* Per-task facts, keyed by task id from `start()` until the settle stamp
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* consumes them: the mode the task runs under (per-call — an escalated task
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* differs from its neighbors) plus its wrap facts. The seam returns facts
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* PER WRAP — a provider may legally vary enforcement or dialect between
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* calls — so overlapping background tasks must each classify against their
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* OWN wrap; a single latest-wrap field would let a later `start()` clobber
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* an earlier task's facts before it settles. A `danger-full-access` task
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* has NO entry (nothing confined it), which is what the settle stamp keys
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* off.
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*/
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private readonly processFacts = new Map<BashProcess, {
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mode: ConfinedSandboxMode
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enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
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denialSignatures: readonly string[]
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runnerFailureSignatures: readonly string[]
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}>()
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constructor(ctx: Context, config: Config) {
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super(ctx, config)
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// schemastery (static Config) already filled the defaulted fields — the
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// cast records that runtime fact (mirrors LocalBashExecutor's config
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// cast). `workspaceRoot` and `cwd` have NO schema default, so their
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// fallback chain is real branching.
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this.mode = config.mode as SandboxMode
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this.workspaceRoot = resolve(config.workspaceRoot ?? config.cwd ?? process.cwd())
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}
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/** The configured default mode — the capability fact the tool layer reads. */
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override get sandboxMode(): SandboxMode {
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return this.mode
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}
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/**
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* Stamp the effective mode onto the spec — the request's explicit override
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* (an approved escalation), else this executor's configured default — so
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* defaulting stays an explicit resolve step and `run()`/`start()` read the
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* spec, never the config.
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*/
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override resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
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return { ...super.resolve(request), sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode ?? this.mode }
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}
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override async run(spec: BashExecSpec): Promise<BashRunResult> {
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// resolve() always stamps the mode; the cast records that invariant
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// (mirrors the constructor's config casts).
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const mode = spec.sandboxMode as SandboxMode
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if (mode === 'danger-full-access') {
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const result = await super.run(spec)
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return { ...result, sandbox: { mode, denied: false } }
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}
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const confined = this.confine(spec.command, mode)
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const result = await super.run({ ...spec, command: confined.command })
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// Runner failure outranks denial: the sandbox itself failed and the
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// command NEVER RAN — surface the same structured fail-closed error a
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// confine-time discovery throws (late detection, same outcome), with
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// the runner's own first stderr line as the cause. Returning it as a
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// task result would let a broken sandbox read as a failing command.
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if (classifyRunnerFailure(result, confined.runnerFailureSignatures)) {
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throw new SandboxUnavailableError(mode, result.stderr.text.trim().split('\n')[0])
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}
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return { ...result, sandbox: { mode, denied: classifyDenial(result, confined.denialSignatures), enforcement: confined.enforcement } }
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}
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override start(spec: BashExecSpec): BashProcess {
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// Same stamped-by-resolve invariant as run().
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const mode = spec.sandboxMode as SandboxMode
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if (mode === 'danger-full-access') return super.start(spec)
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// Sandbox facts are stamped at settle time by onProcessDone()
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// (denial classification runs against the settled task's collected
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// stderr). The map entry lands synchronously after spawn, strictly
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// before the earliest possible settle (a process exit reaches us no
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// sooner than the next tick).
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const confined = this.confine(spec.command, mode)
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const proc = super.start({ ...spec, command: confined.command })
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const { enforcement, denialSignatures, runnerFailureSignatures } = confined
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this.processFacts.set(proc, { mode, enforcement, denialSignatures, runnerFailureSignatures })
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return proc
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}
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/**
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* Stamp the sandbox facts BEFORE completion listeners run: the base
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* executor notifies from inside the task's settle path, so overriding the
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* notification point is what makes `task.sandbox` visible to `onTaskDone`
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* consumers and `done` awaiters alike. Each task classifies against the
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* facts of ITS OWN wrap and reports ITS OWN mode (consumed from the
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* per-task map here — settle is the entry's end of life): with per-call
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* escalation, tasks under different modes settle side by side, so keying
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* anything off the configured default would misreport them. A
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* `danger-full-access` task has no map entry and carries no facts (nothing
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* confined it); a signal-killed task (null exit code) is never a denial,
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* mirroring the foreground classifier.
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*/
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protected override onProcessDone(proc: BashProcess, running: RunningBash): void {
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const facts = this.processFacts.get(proc)
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if (facts !== undefined) {
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this.processFacts.delete(proc)
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const stderr = running.stderr.readFrom(0).text
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// Runner failure outranks denial (the command never ran; the runner's
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// own error text can contain denial words). A settled task has no
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// error channel left, so the fact IS the surface here — the foreground
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// path throws instead.
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const runnerFailed = matchesSignature(proc.exitCode, stderr, facts.runnerFailureSignatures)
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proc.sandbox = {
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mode: facts.mode,
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denied: !runnerFailed && matchesSignature(proc.exitCode, stderr, facts.denialSignatures),
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enforcement: facts.enforcement,
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...(runnerFailed ? { runnerFailed } : {}),
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}
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}
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super.onProcessDone(proc, running)
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}
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/**
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* Wrap one shell command via the `ctx.sandbox` provider: hand over the
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* exact `['bash', '-c', command]` argv this executor would spawn, get back
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* the confined argv, and re-assemble it into the `exec …` command string
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* the inherited spawn path runs (the outer `bash -c` that `runBash` spawns
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* `exec`s into the runner, so no extra shell lingers). Provider errors
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* (fail-closed `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE`) propagate to the caller unchanged.
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*/
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private confine(command: string, mode: ConfinedSandboxMode): {
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command: string
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enforcement: SandboxEnforcement
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denialSignatures: readonly string[]
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runnerFailureSignatures: readonly string[]
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} {
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const confined = this.ctx.sandbox.confine(['bash', '-c', command], { mode, workspaceRoot: this.workspaceRoot })
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return {
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command: `exec ${confined.argv.map(shellQuote).join(' ')}`,
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enforcement: confined.enforcement,
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denialSignatures: confined.denialSignatures,
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runnerFailureSignatures: confined.runnerFailureSignatures,
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}
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}
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}
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export default SandboxBashExecutor
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Block a user