test(subprocess): harden host-exit cleanup fixtures

This commit is contained in:
pku-xht
2026-08-11 22:56:45 +08:00
parent 87778a43aa
commit 84b15efd85
9 changed files with 21 additions and 16 deletions
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ No direct invalidation; the named consumers own any request-prefix changes.
- **Windows tree support is best-effort** — termination routes through `taskkill /PID <pid> /T /F` with all outcomes contained (absent tree, races, missing binary), and liveness falls back to the direct-child boundary.
- **Terminal process inspection is Linux/macOS only** — the terminal primitive fails when its inspector has no supported platform implementation; Linux exact probes cover x64 and arm64, while macOS uses `ps` snapshots.
- **A daemonized terminal descendant can still escape the observable boundary** — on macOS, a child that reparents before any foreground-inspection snapshot is no longer discoverable from the `node-pty` root; on Linux, a child that calls `setsid` leaves both the tree and owned terminal session. The local provider does not add a continuous process-table monitor.
- **In-process cleanup requires a JavaScript-observable exit** — direct `process.exit()`, default uncaught exceptions, and default unhandled rejections emit Node's synchronous `exit` event. `SIGKILL`, fatal OOM, `process.abort()`, native crashes, power loss, and any failure that cannot run JavaScript require an external supervisor, container init, or equivalent OS owner.
- **In-process cleanup requires a JavaScript-observable exit** — direct `process.exit()`, default uncaught exceptions, and default unhandled rejections emit Node's synchronous `exit` event. The default OS disposition for an unhandled `SIGTERM`, `SIGINT`, or `SIGHUP` bypasses that event; an application covers those signals only by installing a handler that performs normal disposal or calls `process.exit()`. `SIGKILL`, fatal OOM, `process.abort()`, native crashes, power loss, and any failure that cannot run JavaScript require an external supervisor, container init, or equivalent OS owner.
- **The credential scrub is a name heuristic** — `*KEY*`/`*PASSWORD*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*` only; differently-named secrets (e.g. `*PASSPHRASE*`) pass through, and a whitelist for over-scrubbed vars is noted future work.
- **Completed spill files are not deleted** — bounded full-output recovery files (and the private per-process spill dir) accumulate under the OS tmpdir until something external cleans them; oversize incomplete spills are discarded and deletion is attempted immediately, but a cleanup failure can leave a bounded file behind.