refactor(agent): unify sourced message delivery
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Status: implemented
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## Problem
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The harness's extension surface is its typed interception seams ([the interception-seams Agent Note](2026-06-30-interception-seams.md)): a "native hook" is just an ordinary cordis plugin subscribing to `agent/session-start`, `agent/prompt-submit`, `tools/pre-execute`, `tools/post-execute`, `agent/turn-continuation`, `subagent/start`, `subagent/end`. But users arrive with **existing** Claude Code (CC) and Codex hook configs — a `hooks.json` (or a settings file's `hooks` key) full of shell-command hooks — and want those to run unmodified. This Agent Note introduces the two **bridge plugins** that translate that external shell-hook protocol onto the typed seams, built on the shared wire-protocol library ([the hook-protocol-lib Agent Note](2026-06-30-hook-protocol-lib.md)).
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The harness's extension surface is its typed interception seams ([the interception-seams Agent Note](2026-06-30-interception-seams.md)): a "native hook" is just an ordinary cordis plugin subscribing to `agent/session-start`, `agent/prompt-submit`, `tools/pre-execute`, `tools/post-execute`, `agent/stopping`, `subagent/start`, or `subagent/end`. But users arrive with **existing** Claude Code (CC) and Codex hook configs — a `hooks.json` (or a settings file's `hooks` key) full of shell-command hooks — and want those to run unmodified. This Agent Note introduces the two **bridge plugins** that translate that external shell-hook protocol onto the typed seams, built on the shared wire-protocol library ([the hook-protocol-lib Agent Note](2026-06-30-hook-protocol-lib.md)).
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The framing that shapes the whole design: **a bridge is a compatibility adapter, not a power tool.** Anything a bridge does (block a tool, inject context, force continuation, observe a subagent) a native cordis plugin does more powerfully — typed returns, full `ctx`, no serialization boundary. The bridge's reason to exist is to run the explicitly supported subset of external CC/Codex command hooks. That keeps each bridge thin: parse the config, pick a matcher mode, build the per-event payload, call `runHook` + `mergeHookOutputs` from the shared lib, and map the neutral outcome onto a seam Decision. The package READMEs own the exact current unsupported-event and partial-field inventory against the official protocols.
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Each bridge maps the neutral `MergedHookOutcome` from the shared lib onto the se
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| `agent/prompt-submit` | `deny`→`block`; context-only→delegate+fold | `block`→`block`; context-only→delegate+fold |
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| `tools/pre-execute` | `deny`→`deny`; `ask`→`ask` | `block`→`deny` (no allow/ask) |
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| `tools/post-execute` | `deny`→`block`+feedback; context-only→delegate+fold | same |
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| `agent/turn-continuation` | blocking Stop → `continue` (reason = next-step steering) | same |
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| `agent/stopping` | blocking Stop → next-step steering | same |
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| `subagent/start` (emit) | additionalContext → inject into a live in-process child; a remote child has no local injection target | unsupported by this bridge |
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| `subagent/end` (emit) | observe-only | unsupported by this bridge |
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@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ The CC bridge's `ask` result is a real permission path, not a terminal bridge de
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### Context source is always the plugin (the mislabel guard)
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`agent.inject()` defaults a missing `MessageSource` to `{ kind: 'user' }`, so every bridge `inject()` and `HookContext` passes `{ kind: 'plugin', plugin: 'hooks-claude' | 'hooks-codex' }`. Unit coverage pins the resulting `context/message.source` as the plugin rather than the user.
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Every bridge `inject()` and additional-context input explicitly passes `{ kind: 'plugin', plugin: 'hooks-claude' | 'hooks-codex' }`. Unit coverage pins the resulting `user/message.source` as the plugin rather than the user.
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`UserPromptSubmit` runs during admission, before any turn opens. It therefore writes no turn-scoped `hook/invoked` / `hook/result` pair: a block leaves no transcript, while allowed additional context is durably represented by its sourced `user/message`. The Codex payload still receives the candidate next `turn_id`; rejection does not consume that number.
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### Adding context is not a veto — delegate, then prepend
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@@ -55,13 +57,13 @@ Hooks run in the agent's session workspace, so relative paths target the user's
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- **Tool-input rewrite.** A CC/Codex `updatedInput` is logged + warned, not honored — input rewrite is a deferred consistency-design problem ([the pre-tool-input-rewrite Agent Note](../../proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md)), because the pre-execution args are read by `tool/call` audit + `assistant/message` history + ACP/tool-bash presentation, so an honest rewrite is a design unit, not a field.
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- **Stop loop-guard** (`TODO(stop-loop-guard)`). Claude Code supplies `stop_hook_active` and overrides a hook after eight consecutive blocks; Codex supplies `stop_hook_active` but documents no equivalent cap. Both bridges always report `false`, so a Stop hook that unconditionally blocks force-continues every step — a hook author must self-limit until state tracking lands.
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- **Hook `continue:false` (hard halt).** A hook can ask to halt the whole run (CC/Codex `continue:false`); the shared merge folds it into `MergedHookOutcome.stop`/`stopReason`, but no bridge acts on it (`TODO(hook-continue-false)`) — the interception seams have no "hard-halt the agent" primitive yet (a Decision blocks/steers a single point, not the run). Deferred with the loop-guard work; the halt request is recorded in the `hook/result` log, and the hook keeps its per-point effect (decision/context) meanwhile.
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- **Hook `continue:false` (hard halt).** A hook can ask to halt the whole run (CC/Codex `continue:false`); the shared merge folds it into `MergedHookOutcome.stop`/`stopReason`, but no bridge acts on it (`TODO(hook-continue-false)`) — the interception seams have no "hard-halt the agent" primitive yet (a Decision blocks/steers a single point, not the run). Deferred with the loop-guard work; mid-turn requests record the halt in `hook/result`, and the hook keeps its per-point effect (decision/context) meanwhile.
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- **Config discovery.** The path is explicit in `cordis.yml` and process-level (see above); the full multi-layer CC/Codex precedence walk, per-session project-local discovery, and the trust/hash model are not reimplemented (`TODO(per-session-hook-config)`).
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- **Session-start / subagent-start context is best-effort (`TODO(session-start-gating)`).** Both hooks run detached from startup, so their context is injected when ready but may miss the first request or a short-lived child. Guaranteeing first-request delivery requires an awaited startup seam.
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## Alternatives considered
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**Concurrent per-point hook execution.** The reference engines run a point's matched hooks concurrently and fold the results. These bridges run them **serially** (`await` per hook inside the match loop) and fold with the same most-restrictive merge. Serial is deliberate: it keeps each hook's `hook/invoked`/`hook/result` pair adjacent and in a deterministic order in the session log, and the fold is order-independent for the decision (`deny > ask > allow`) so the outcome matches. The cost is latency (hook *N* waits for hook *N−1*) and that per-hook timeouts are not overlapped — acceptable for the hook counts real configs use; revisit if a config ever fans out enough for the wall-clock to matter.
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**Concurrent per-point hook execution.** The reference engines run a point's matched hooks concurrently and fold the results. These bridges run them **serially** (`await` per hook inside the match loop) and fold with the same most-restrictive merge. Serial is deliberate: for turn-scoped points it keeps each hook's `hook/invoked`/`hook/result` pair adjacent and in deterministic order, and the fold is order-independent for the decision (`deny > ask > allow`) so the outcome matches. The cost is latency (hook *N* waits for hook *N−1*) and that per-hook timeouts are not overlapped — acceptable for the hook counts real configs use; revisit if a config ever fans out enough for the wall-clock to matter.
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## Consequences
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