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revert(sandbox): withdraw the credential-document read denial

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The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux
confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point
inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the
entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that
has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install:

  bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system

which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every
confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/`
read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a
file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an
omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable).

A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it
does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible
backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue
plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not
the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer.

The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into
`process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
This commit is contained in:
Yichen Jiang
2026-07-30 17:09:42 +08:00
parent 52ae578982
commit a90ccc4453
27 changed files with 38 additions and 262 deletions
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packages/credentials/credentials-local/README.md
+2 -5
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@@ -32,12 +32,9 @@ External edits publish `credentials/updated` per changed reference after the sna
## Security boundary
The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, so under the shipped `danger-full-access` default they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns. Two things narrow that:
The document is `0600` under a `0700` directory, which stops other OS users — **not** the model. Tool processes (bash, the filesystem tools) run as the same user, so under the shipped `danger-full-access` default they can read this file exactly like any other file the user owns, and no sandbox mode singles it out. What the harness does hold to is narrower: it never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment (see [app-boot's Personal config](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)), so reaching the value takes a deliberate read of a path the agent was not given.
- A **confining sandbox mode** denies the credential document specifically: [`dsh-sandbox-policy`](../../sandbox/sandbox-policy/README.md) defaults `readDenyPaths` to `$DSH_HOME/.env`, and the Seatbelt and bwrap backends enforce it (Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/` read grant and reports `partial`). The denial names the file, not the home, so the model keeps its documented access to its own session log.
- The harness never hands the model a resolved path to the document, and never loads it into the process environment (see [app-boot's Personal config](../../ui/app-boot/README.md#personal-config)).
Neither makes an unconfined agent safe. A deployment that must keep provider keys away from its own agent should run a confining mode; an OS-keychain provider — a store the model's processes cannot read at all — is the deferred answer and belongs beside this provider as a sibling package.
That is discretion, not a boundary. A deployment that must keep provider keys away from its own agent cannot get there with file permissions; an OS-keychain provider — a store the model's processes cannot read at all — is the deferred answer and belongs beside this provider as a sibling package.
## Model Experience