Pine/deepseek-harness
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions 1 Packages Projects Releases 1 Wiki Activity

fix(review): reconcile sandbox and approval contracts

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-11 21:37:38 +08:00
parent 6a13dcb364
commit b29a8eca71
61 changed files with 620 additions and 358 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
packages/ui/acp/README.md
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# @deepseek-ai/dsh-acp
The **Agent Client Protocol (ACP)** bridge: exposes DeepSeek Harness SDK agents as an ACP server over JSON-RPC stdio, so editors (Zed and other ACP clients) can drive them — streaming render, tool-call display, and resumable sessions. Zed is the current target client: baseline ACP behavior should remain reasonable for other clients, but bridge capabilities and compatibility decisions are evaluated against Zed first. **N concurrent sessions per connection** (see [ACP multi-session](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md)): each maps to its own `ReactLoopAgent`, and every event is demuxed strictly by session id so two sessions streaming at once never interleave.
The **Agent Client Protocol (ACP)** bridge: exposes DeepSeek Harness SDK agents as an ACP server over JSON-RPC stdio, so editors (Zed and other ACP clients) can drive them — streaming render, tool-call display, and resumable sessions. Zed is the current target client: baseline ACP behavior should remain reasonable for other clients, but bridge capabilities and compatibility decisions are evaluated against Zed first. **N concurrent sessions per connection** (see [ACP multi-session](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-multi-session.md)): each maps to its own `ReactLoopAgent`, and every event is demuxed strictly by session id so two sessions streaming at once never interleave.
It is a **client-driver / UI plugin**, the structured analogue of the readline `stdio-chat` plugin — NOT a loop change and NOT a [capability seam](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-13-capability-seams.md). It consumes the existing `agent/*` event taxonomy, the `dsh-agent` create/resume factory, and `dsh-session-persistence`.
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The `initialize` handshake reports a fixed server identity (`agentInfo: { name:
| `session/cancel` | `agent.cancel()` | the queue-aware cancel: aborts a running step, clears queued + steering work, and drops a turn about to start, then settles the prompt `cancelled` — for ONLY that session (a cancel never touches another session's stream or prompt) |
| `session/update` | `session/event` | `agent_message_chunk` (text-delta), `agent_thought_chunk` (reasoning-delta), `user_message_chunk` (load replay), `tool_call`/`tool_call_update` (the render intent — a `card`-tagged `ToolCallView`/`ToolResultView` — owned by the TOOL via `presentCall`/`presentResult`, which the bridge switches on to build the wire shape — see Tool-call presentation) |
| `elicitation/create` | `ctx.userInteraction.ask()` | maps `ask_user_question` questions to ACP form elicitations; option descriptions are shown in enum titles, `multi_select` uses ACP array enums, optionless requests use a required `custom` field, and a non-empty custom answer overrides any selected choice |
| `session/request_permission` | `approval/request` listener | the bridge is the [`ctx.approval`](../../approval/approval/README.md) answerer for the agents it owns: an `ask` (a hook or `tools/pre-execute` plugin) becomes an editor prompt attached to the streamed tool call, offering one-shot `allow_once`/`reject_once` options only; a foreign or call-less request delegates down the answerer chain (fail-closed `unavailable` default). See "Permission prompts" |
| `session/request_permission` | `approval/request` listener | the bridge is the [`ctx.approval`](../user-approval/README.md) answerer for the agents it owns: an `ask` (a hook or `tools/pre-execute` plugin) becomes an editor prompt attached to the streamed tool call, offering one-shot `allow_once`/`reject_once` options only; a foreign or call-less request delegates down the answerer chain (fail-closed `unavailable` default). See "Permission prompts" |
| `session/set_config_option` | `setSandboxMode` / `setApprovalPolicy` | per-session knob switching over [session config options](https://agentclientprotocol.com/protocol/session-config-options) — see "Session config options" |
## Multi-session
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ A `session/prompt` resolves (or rejects) exactly once, keyed off the canonical s
## Permission prompts
The bridge registers an `approval/request` waterfall listener — the ACP answerer of the [approval seam](../../approval/approval/README.md). When `ctx.approval` routes an `ask` for an agent the bridge owns, the listener resolves the owning session through the reverse map and issues `session/request_permission` with the request's `callId` as the `toolCall` reference (the editor attaches the prompt to the already-streamed call) and the one-shot options `allow_once`/`reject_once` (`allow_always` is deferred to the approval RFC's grant-storage question). Outcomes map `allow-once → allowed-once`, any other selection → `rejected` (an unknown optionId from a non-conforming client never grants), client `cancelled → cancelled`. A request for an agent the bridge does NOT own — or one without a `callId` to attach to — delegates via `next()` so another answerer or the seam's fail-closed `unavailable` default takes it. A rejected `requestPermission` RPC (client gone mid-prompt) propagates to the ApprovalService, which contains it as `unavailable`. Whether a call asks at all is policy — a hook or `tools/pre-execute` plugin returning `ask` — never the bridge's own judgment; without such policy, tools keep the executor's full authority.
The bridge registers an `approval/request` waterfall listener — the ACP answerer of the [user-approval seam](../user-approval/README.md). When `ctx.approval` routes an `ask` for an agent the bridge owns, the listener resolves the owning session through the reverse map and issues `session/request_permission` with the request's `callId` as the `toolCall` reference (the editor attaches the prompt to the already-streamed call) and the one-shot options `allow_once`/`reject_once` (`allow_always` is deferred to the approval RFC's grant-storage question). Outcomes map `allow-once → allowed-once`, any other selection → `rejected` (an unknown optionId from a non-conforming client never grants), client `cancelled → cancelled`. A request for an agent the bridge does NOT own — or one without a `callId` to attach to — delegates via `next()` so another answerer or the seam's fail-closed `unavailable` default takes it. A rejected `requestPermission` RPC (client gone mid-prompt) propagates to the ApprovalService, which contains it as `unavailable`. Whether a call asks at all is policy — a hook or `tools/pre-execute` plugin returning `ask` — never the bridge's own judgment; without such policy, tools keep the executor's full authority.
## Disposal & disconnect
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Teardown reaches quiescence: for EVERY live session settle any pending prompt as
## stdout is the protocol
The JSON-RPC frames go on stdout, so this plugin MUST run in an example that loads **no stdout logger** (the console logger writes to stdout and would corrupt the frames). The guarantee is config-only — see `examples/acp-agent` (no console logger) and [ACP support risks](../../../docs/rfc/proposed/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md#risks). A stderr exporter is fine for logging.
The JSON-RPC frames go on stdout, so this plugin MUST run in an example that loads **no stdout logger** (the console logger writes to stdout and would corrupt the frames). The guarantee is config-only — see `examples/acp-agent` (no console logger) and [ACP support risks](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-06-14-acp-agent-client-protocol.md#risks). A stderr exporter is fine for logging.
## Running