docs: address model experience review

This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-12 02:55:26 +08:00
parent a08485fc80
commit b5cd511f35
64 changed files with 443 additions and 410 deletions
@@ -4,12 +4,6 @@ Shared machinery for **out-of-process subagent backends** — providers that spa
Every tunable is a **parameter**: the dispose ladder takes its grace periods per call, the config-dir helper takes an optional pinned path. Defaults live in each consuming plugin's Config (defaulted, validated fields changeable from `cordis.yml`), never in this library.
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| None directly | This process utility registers no provider, prompt, tool, or message. A consuming backend's child application decides the child's model context; environment scrubbing and isolated config directories prevent ambient credentials and user state from silently changing that composition. | Zero direct tokens. It can indirectly stabilize child context, but it adds no text to parent or child requests. |
## What it exports
### `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` / `buildChildEnv(extra)`
@@ -45,6 +39,12 @@ A per-run isolated config directory for an external CLI child (the target of `CL
`tests/subagent-subprocess.spec.ts`: the env scrub and config-dir helpers run against the real process env and real filesystem (the rm-failure path injects its rejection at the fs boundary — a real recursive-rm failure is not portably provokable, and root ignores permission bits); the exit waits and the dispose ladder run against a scriptable fake child, driving each escalation tier deterministically. The [ACP backend suite](../subagent-acp/README.md) exercises the same ladder against real subprocesses (EOF-cooperative, EOF-ignoring, and SIGTERM-trapping children) end to end.
## Model Experience
| Context surface | What the model sees | Token effect |
|---|---|---|
| None directly | This process utility registers no provider, prompt, tool, or message. A consuming backend's child application decides the child's model context; environment scrubbing and isolated config directories prevent ambient credentials and user state from silently changing that composition. | Zero direct tokens. It can indirectly stabilize child context, but it adds no text to parent or child requests. |
## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- **The credential scrub is name-based** — only variables matching `KEY` / `SECRET` / `TOKEN` are removed; differently named secrets such as `PASSWORD` pass through unless the backend supplies a stricter environment.