Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/session-scoped-sandbox-roots
# Conflicts: # examples/acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts # packages/examples/agent-spine-demo/package.json # pnpm-lock.yaml
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ The filesystem stack: a provider seam (text IO + atomic mutation with an optiona
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| `fs-local/` | Local-filesystem `FileSystem` implementation | (registers `ctx.fs`) |
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| `fs-sandbox/` | Sandbox-enforcing `FileSystem`: extends `fs-local` and fences write/edit by the per-call mode + workspace root policy (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to the session workspace + temp roots), reads pass through | (registers `ctx.fs`) |
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| `fs-policy/` | Policy gate plugin: observed-state + read-before-edit + version-guarded write/edit, via the `fs/*` event gate | (no service — `fs/*` listeners) |
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| `tool-fs/` | Model-facing `read`/`write`/`edit` tools AND the executor (reads via `ctx.fs`, owns read windowing, dispatches `fs/*`); resolves relative paths from the filesystem identity of the session cwd and advertises sandbox escalation fields when the mounted `ctx.fs` confines | (registers on `ctx.tools`) |
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| `tool-fs/` | Model-facing `read`/`write`/`edit` tools AND the executor (reads via `ctx.fs`, owns read windowing, dispatches `fs/*`); preserves filesystem semantics for session-cwd-relative paths and advertises sandbox escalation fields when the mounted `ctx.fs` confines | (registers on `ctx.tools`) |
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| `tool-fs-search/` | Model-facing `glob`/`grep` discovery tools when `rg` is available on the bash executor `PATH`, backed by fixed ripgrep commands through `ctx.bash`, NOT by `ctx.fs` provider methods | (registers on `ctx.tools`) |
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The interface lives at `fs/fs/`. A sandboxed, remote, or project-scoped filesystem backend can replace `fs-local` without touching the seam, the policy gate, or the model-facing tool schemas — `fs-sandbox` is the first such replacement (an in-process path fence over the shared sandbox mode; see [the cross-family fs sandbox Agent Note](../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md)). The policy (`fs-policy/`) is a plugin that participates only through the `fs/*` event gate, not a service the tool injects — so dropping it gracefully loses the policy and leaves the unconstrained bare provider rather than breaking the tool. A deployment that loads `tool-fs/` is expected to also load it. The mode fence and the read-before-edit gate are orthogonal and compose. Discovery (`tool-fs-search/`) deliberately does NOT extend the provider seam: search is a process-backed `rg` workflow on the bash executor, so filesystem backends stay free of a universal search contract; its tools register only when that executor can find `rg`, and its results are follow-up-readable when the bash workdir and the `read` root are the same workspace (the co-located deployment its README documents).
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