fix(scope): align trust and input boundaries

Rewrite the agent-scope RFC with executable examples and an explicit security non-goal. Harden subagent scalar and depth validation, and pin live tool-filter semantics across code, tests, and generated docs.
2026-07-12 11:17:57 +08:00
parent d427478c44
commit cb03c8c284
29 changed files with 545 additions and 105 deletions
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ export const SERVICE_API: readonly ServiceApiEntry[] = [
  },
  {
    key: 'systemPrompt',
-    summary: 'Registry service (`ctx.systemPrompt`): plugins contribute ordered text sections, tool-schema providers, named prompt variables, and authoritative contribution protections; the agent loop calls `assemble(context)` once per step.',
+    summary: 'Registry service (`ctx.systemPrompt`): plugins contribute ordered text sections, tool-schema providers, named prompt variables, and owner-final contribution protections; the agent loop calls `assemble(context)` once per step.',
    methods: [
      'section(section: PromptSection): () => Promise<void> | void',
      'tools(provider: (context: AssembleContext) => ToolProviderResult): () => Promise<void> | void',