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refactor(e2b): narrow the sandbox POC

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Tianyi Cui
2026-07-30 04:25:47 +08:00
parent bb0be75d85
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.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-07-28-portable-execution-world-consumers.md
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@@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ Generic consumers use that execution world:
## E2B POC boundary
The opt-in E2B realization has exactly three provider-specific packages under `packages/e2b/`: `dsh-e2b` creates or reconnects one sandbox and owns kill/pause/leave disposal, `dsh-fs-e2b` implements `ctx.fs`, and `dsh-subprocess-e2b` implements `ctx.subprocess` over E2B Commands, PTYs, and remote Linux process groups. The two adapters obtain the sole sandbox identity from the owner and never create private sandboxes.
The opt-in E2B realization has exactly three provider-specific packages under `packages/e2b/`: `dsh-e2b` creates one sandbox and deletes it on timeout or disposal, `dsh-fs-e2b` implements `ctx.fs`, and `dsh-subprocess-e2b` implements `ctx.subprocess` over E2B Commands, PTYs, and remote Linux process groups. The two adapters obtain the sole SDK handle from the owner and never create private sandboxes.
E2B owns the mutable filesystem, managed command and Bash processes, terminal allocation and terminal-session groups, language-server processes and source reads, subprocess Code Runtime processes, and adapter-private files under `.dsh-e2b`. The host owns Cordis and plugin objects, the agent loop, agent/session/goal state, session logs and persistence, LLM calls, prompts and tools, authority, skills, subagent orchestration, PTY buffers and readiness, LSP protocol state, Code Runtime program/binding/output policy, and E2B SDK/network buffers. The overlay neither uploads nor synchronizes the host workspace.
The adapters retain only substrate mechanics. Filesystem canonicalization crosses the SDK's decoded command transport as strict base64-encoded NUL framing; streamed reads leave byte ceilings with consumers. Subprocess command output and environment snapshots use ASCII/base64 where SDK chunk decoding would otherwise lose bytes, while private control shells isolate profiles and later launches blank discovered credential-shaped names. Process and terminal cleanup uses remote groups and proves quiescence before settlement.
Retaining a sandbox preserves remote files and unmanaged state only. Reconnect does not reconstruct host process or terminal handles, protocol connections, pending calls, output cursors, timers, or locks. The POC adds no session-persistence backend, template builder, volume, snapshot, network-policy layer, sandbox catalog, workspace synchronization, durable remote handles, or whole-harness execution.
Sandbox state is deliberately ephemeral: timeout and disposal delete the remote files and unmanaged state. The POC adds no reconnect or pause/leave retention, session-persistence backend, template builder, volume, snapshot, network-policy layer, sandbox catalog, workspace synchronization, durable remote handles, or whole-harness execution.
## Verification
Focused package suites pin sandbox lifecycle, canonical path framing, filesystem metadata and atomic versions, subprocess publication/rollback, terminal text I/O and session cleanup, output limits, cancellation, disposal, and invariant registration. A credential-gated Loader composition exercises the same three-package provider through source imports and built exports, including FS/Bash visibility, post-rename version reread plus guarded edit, hostile login profiles, byte-split UTF-8 output, process and terminal cleanup, LSP document bounds, Code Runtime bindings/limits/cleanup, host-workspace isolation, and final sandbox deletion.
Focused package suites pin sandbox lifecycle, canonical path framing, filesystem metadata and atomic versions, subprocess publication/rollback, terminal text I/O and session cleanup, output limits, cancellation, disposal, and invariant registration. A credential-gated Loader composition exercises the same three-package provider through source imports and built exports, including FS/Bash visibility, hostile login profiles, byte-split UTF-8 output, process and terminal cleanup, LSP queries, Code Runtime bindings and cleanup, host-workspace isolation, and final sandbox deletion.
## Alternatives considered
@@ -70,4 +70,4 @@ The fundamental interfaces are wider, and a filesystem/subprocess pair must agre
The local implementation absorbs `node-pty` and platform process inspection because it owns local terminal mechanics. This moves code without weakening terminal teardown: disposal sweeps descendants before and after terminating the top-level shell, waits for exact PID-identity-fenced descendants retained during foreground inspection, and retains Linux session members that survive top-level exit. macOS cannot enumerate a POSIX session after its leader exits, so a child that reparents between inspection snapshots remains an explicit local-provider limitation rather than a reason to move process mechanics back into the PTY consumer.
The E2B composition demonstrates that a shared sandbox owner plus filesystem and subprocess adapters are sufficient to move the mutable coding world off-host while leaving higher capabilities provider-neutral. Its POC limits remain explicit: the SDK retains complete command transport in host memory, remote startup cannot publish a PID synchronously, exact terminal stdin-wait and independent signal facts are unavailable, numeric PID/PGID operations are not identity-fenced, the initial environment probe cannot hide unknown sandbox-default secrets from already-running same-UID processes, retained artifacts accumulate, and escaped processes or reconnect state are not recovered. These are provider constraints, not justification for compatibility shims or more E2B packages.
The E2B composition demonstrates that a shared sandbox owner plus filesystem and subprocess adapters are sufficient to move the mutable coding world off-host while leaving higher capabilities provider-neutral. Its POC limits remain explicit: the SDK retains complete command transport in host memory, remote startup cannot publish a PID synchronously, exact terminal stdin-wait and independent signal facts are unavailable, numeric PID/PGID operations are not identity-fenced, the initial environment probe cannot hide unknown sandbox-default secrets from already-running same-UID processes, and adapter artifacts remain until sandbox deletion. These are provider constraints, not justification for compatibility shims or more E2B packages.