Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/simp-prune-workflow-worker-surface

# Conflicts:
#	docs/config-catalog.md
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-14 17:41:20 +08:00
562 changed files with 4439 additions and 12572 deletions
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/**
* The `node:worker_threads` workflow engine: the {@link WorkflowService}
* implementation. Runs each script in its OWN worker thread (one run = one
* worker, no pooling — a run is heavyweight, so thread spin-up is noise): the
* body executes in a vm context INSIDE the worker with the workflow hooks
* injected, and `agent()` calls bridge back to `ctx.subagents` over the
* message port — child agents are I/O-bound LLM loops and stay on the host
* event loop; the thread isolates the SCRIPT, the only part that can spin
* synchronously.
*
* TRUST PREMISE: scripts are MODEL-WRITTEN — the same trust level as the
* model's existing bash access — so this engine defends against BUGGY
* scripts, never hostile ones. A worker thread is NOT a security boundary:
* the vm context inside it is escapable by construction, and an escapee
* holds the same process privileges as the host (Node's permission model is
* process-wide); genuine sandboxing (isolated-vm, a separate process) is an
* engine swap behind the seam. What the thread buys, concretely:
*
* - `start()` never blocks the host: the script's initial synchronous slice
* (and any later synchronous spin) occupies the WORKER's event loop, not
* the harness's.
* - Termination is REAL: a script that outlives its post-cancel grace is
* `worker.terminate()`d — nothing of the script survives `dispose()`,
* where an in-process engine could only abandon the spin on its own loop.
* - The value boundary is serialization by construction: everything crossing
* the thread is structured-clone data (and plain JSON before that, by the
* materialization walk in ./realm.ts).
*
* Engine-specific limitations: worker startup (~tens of ms) is paid per run;
* on a termination path `agentsStarted` reports the host-observed child
* count (calls still queued worker-side for a slot are unknowable — see
* ./host.ts); and a worker that dies unexpectedly (an OOM, a script reaching
* `process.exit` through the documented vm escape) settles the run
* `stopReason: 'error'` with the exit diagnostics.
*
* Plugin export shape: a default-exported {@link WorkflowService} subclass
* (the class-based service form, like `dsh-bash-local`).
*
* Worker-thread workflow engine. Each run executes its model-written script in
* an escapable vm context on a fresh worker and bridges `agent()` calls to host
* subagents. The thread prevents synchronous script work from blocking the host
* and permits forced termination, but it is containment rather than a security boundary.
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-workflow-workerthread
*/