refactor agent pre-step inbox lifecycle

2026-07-31 19:21:16 +08:00
parent c2ff9ddec8
commit fcc2b5e282
267 changed files with 2052 additions and 1546 deletions
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at th
 - **Per-session dynamic tool schemas** — rejected: schemas are registry-global by design (one assembly vocabulary, the pinned-header snapshot contract), and re-registering per session would buy only what the execution-time strict-wider check already guarantees, at the cost of a per-session schema surface and header churn on every switch.
 - **Hard-match the retry to a prior denial** — rejected: command-string identity is fragile (quoting, `workdir`, env prefixes, a pipeline retried as its failing stage) — false-rejects honest retries or is trivially satisfied; the real boundary is the human seeing command + justification. Revisit only if `allow_always` grant storage ever needs machine-checkable scopes.
 - **A generic `env/state` facts map with an owner service** — rejected: approval and sandbox compose independently, so neither's state may drag in a third package; single-key folds are one `findLast` each, dissolving the owner service; no invariant spans the knobs, so atomic multi-key patches bought nothing.
- **Narrate via `agent/user-message` + a bus event** — rejected: it presupposes a turn-entry seam that does not exist (the real seam is `agent/prompt-submit`), and pre-step's position serves both the coalesced turn-entry notice and the mid-turn immediacy bound with one listener.
+- **Narrate via `agent/user-message` + a bus event** — rejected: it presupposes a turn-entry seam that does not exist (the real seam is `agent/pre-step`), and pre-step's position serves both the coalesced turn-entry notice and the mid-turn immediacy bound with one listener.
 - **A standing prompt statement of the sandbox mode (+ a switch narrator)** — shipped first, then removed on live evidence: with `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` in every request, the model refused to ATTEMPT denied-then-escalatable work (five of twelve turns in the first manual session ended with zero tool calls), turning the sandbox into a soft lockout. The denial marker names the mode at the moment it matters and the escalation fields carry the recovery; the approval knob keeps its statement because an auto-rejection is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human "no".
 - **Track "last told" with its own bookkeeping events** — rejected: the `request/header` fold already records the exact prompt the model saw; parsing the closed candidate sentences back replaces a second bookkeeping stream — events are needed only where they ARE the store.
 - **Independent sandbox and approval selectors** — rejected: one deployment-defined permission preset keeps the two policy knobs coherent for UI clients that expose runtime switching.
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ What shipped pins — the tiers in Testing hold each:
 - A resumed session's overrides apply with no catch-up state; a default changed while the process was down is narrated before the session's first new request, attributed to the operator.
 - Two concurrent sessions never see each other's state or notices.
 - Two concurrent project sessions in one Cordis context resolve independent workspace roots; bash and fs writes succeed inside the calling session's cwd and fail against its neighbor's cwd.
- `agent-loop` is untouched — everything rides `systemPrompt.section`, `SessionEventMap` merging, `agent.inject()`, `agent/step`, `agent/prompt-submit`, and capability-owned policy resolution.
+- `agent-loop` is untouched — everything rides `systemPrompt.section`, `SessionEventMap` merging, `agent.inject()`, `agent/pre-step`, and capability-owned policy resolution.

 Costs and accepted limits: