The web-app overlay now disables the host tool-pwsh row too, and the shipped
presets (standard/code/cordis) declare both shell tool rows with inverted
platform gates — tool-bash on POSIX, tool-pwsh on win32 — so the preset layer
exposes exactly one shell tool per host and a preset can drop or replace the
shell tool on either platform. windows-shell.spec pins both preset gates and
both host tool rows disabled in the web composition; the loader and Windows
pwsh notes are updated in place.
Address review: the gate module docstring now states the actual evaluation
contexts (config after injections against the plugin context, disabled at
every mount decision against the loader context); metadataExpressionErrors
rejects expressions nested below disabled and syntax-checks the disabled
expression itself so an unparseable gate fails at the gate instead of the
boot. The tutorial's !!js claims follow, and the loader note moves to
implemented/architecture with its inbound links retargeted.
Entry \disabled\ interpolation makes the launcher's separate platform layer
unnecessary: the base bundle's cordis.patch.yml now gates both shell stacks
on its own rows — bash-sandbox/tool-bash disable on win32, and their twins
pwsh-sandbox/tool-pwsh mount only there with the inverted expression — so
exactly one shell stack mounts per host from one shared patch file.
windows.cordis.patch.yml and the launcher's windows-shell.ts injection (boot,
live recomposition, config dumps) are deleted, with the workspace-constraints
entry and the dsh-base exports/files entries following. The windows-shell spec
pins the effective per-platform roster through the real bundle layers, and
base.spec pins the four symmetric gates. The superseded active notes are
updated and cross-linked; the loader note records the fold itself.
The resolver suite previously exercised only fixture patch lists, leaving
the real shipped windows.cordis.patch.yml and the bundle→windows→user
composition ordering untested on Linux CI. The new cases load a temp
profile whose bundle layers resolve from the real dsh-base/dsh-web-app
packages (app installation anchor), apply the platform layer through the
boot's own composeEntries algorithm with the platform injected, and
assert the win32 danger-full-access roster (eight disables, three
inserts, no warnings on the web profile). A second case pins POSIX
unchanged and the base-only-profile ui-permission no-match warning as
warned-but-harmless, matching the patch header's documented contract.
- apps/cli/reference/README: state the win32 permission/sandbox/approval
degradation so the workspace-write promise no longer misleads Windows users
- bundle README + agent note: give the complete bash-restore recipe (disable
pwsh-local/tool-pwsh and re-enable bash-sandbox/tool-bash), since both
executors register the same bash service and an incomplete recipe fails
loud at load
- windows.cordis.patch.yml: header comment notes the recipe and that the
ui-permission row belongs to dsh-web-app (base-only profiles get a
harmless no-match warning)
- profile-boot.ts: rewrap composeProfile JSDoc
- re-record i18n hashes for the touched bilingual pairs
The Windows layer previously kept the approval service with policy 'never',
which made the approval plugin inject 'Approval prompts are disabled in
this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically'
into the model context. On Windows nothing asks for approval — the
escalation surfaces (sandbox_permissions) do not exist — so the sentence
described a rejection surface that is not there. The layer now disables
the approval row too: the service is absent, the model is never told
approval exists, and the danger-full-access degradation is complete.
base.spec.ts pins approval among the Windows disables; the Agent Note and
bundle README record the absent service.
The Windows platform layer previously kept fs path-rule confinement
(sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox) next to the unconfined pwsh shell. Windows
has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the
shell can bypass fs-only path rules with one command — the policy was
theater. The layer now removes the whole sandbox stack (sandbox,
sandbox-policy, fs-sandbox disabled), mounts the unconfined dsh-fs-local,
and degrades to danger-full-access: permission/ui-permission leave the
roster and the approval policy is 'never'.
dsh-base declares dsh-fs-local so the profile module fallback links it for
cold starts; base.spec.ts pins the shipped Windows roster (disables,
inserts, approval policy); the Agent Note records the rejected fs-only
confinement alternative.
win32 hosts booting a shipped profile now get pwsh-local as the ctx.bash
executor and tool-pwsh as the shell tool through the base bundle's new
windows.cordis.patch.yml platform layer, injected by the launcher between
the bundle layers and the user layers on win32. bash-sandbox, tool-bash,
permission, and ui-permission are disabled there: the POSIX-only executor
cannot run on Windows, and dsh-permission requires a confining executor.
Overriding the default is a composition decision through the user's
cordis.patch.yml; there is no environment override channel.
apps/cli and dsh-base re-declare dsh-pwsh-local/dsh-tool-pwsh so the
profile module fallback links them for cold starts (the profiles rework
had dropped them from the CLI closure).
Promotes the windows-pwsh-default Agent Note from proposed to implemented
and documents the platform layer in the base bundle README.
Huanqi Cao