Three findings from review survived against the staged-save head:
The search provider read its options thunk per property, so a settings write
landing inside credential resolution sent the key resolved from the old
section to the endpoint named by the new one. Each operation now snapshots
once at its entry and threads that snapshot into credential resolution; a
regression test drives a commit into the middle of a search and pins that the
endpoint, model, and key all come from the section the search started on.
The /client entry exported components, controllers, and namespace constants
with no consumer, which the client export discipline allows only with sign-off.
Only types remain. The duplicate per-card Injected/Face interface pairs are
one declaration each now, so a member added to one side cannot silently miss
the other.
The credential state carries the reference it describes and its writability: a
reference change no longer projects the old answer onto the new name, an
out-of-order response for a stale reference is dropped, and a key that a
deployment sources from the process environment disables the control instead
of inviting a write the Host must refuse.
Also corrected three prose claims against the code they describe: the card's
fields do not differ by platform (the served schema does), the section's empty
line counts registered rather than visible cards and is read once, and the
search README overstated what a configuration surface learns about a key.
The provider now takes a thunk rather than a value: it projects the
authoritative section per search, so a stored endpoint, model, or key
reference reaches the next call without re-registering the provider — which
would make the seam's provider selection observable as a flicker.
apiKey already carries role('secret'), so the section is safe to describe:
the literal never rides a response in any layer and a configuration surface
learns only that a key is set.
Delete design-session citations (decision/audit/plan ordinals, stack
positions), change narration, review choreography, and reviewer-addressed
justification from comments, JSDoc, docs, READMEs, Agent Notes, tests, and
generator templates; restate every affected fact as current-state contract
prose. Fix generated docs at their sources and regenerate the catalogs and
cordis-surface regions; re-paste type-equiv blocks; update every bilingual
counterpart and re-record the pairs. Record the citation rule in the
committed-artifact-citations Agent Note.
Review found five real defects in the configuration-source work, all confirmed
against the code rather than argued:
1. The note claimed --config outranks settings.yaml. It does not: the settings
seam registers a plugin's cordis entry config as the `base` layer and the
user section layers over it, and the seam cannot tell a shipped value from a
--config one. The note now states shipped reality and names --config-replace
as the lever for a deployment that must win. Separately, a literal `apiKey`
in settings outranked both the environment and .credentials.yaml — the field
is removed, so configuration carries a reference and nothing else.
2. DEEPSEEK_SEARCH_BASE_URL was functionally deleted: the shipped inline went
away without the provider learning to read it. It now resolves from the
environment snapshot, as the README always claimed.
3. The bootstrap deny list missed the interpreter start-up hooks. BASH_ENV is
the sharpest: `bash -c` sources it on every bash tool call, so a project
.env could run a file of its choosing before every command. The list now
covers BASH_ENV and its per-language siblings, the Git hook commands, and
the remaining preload and CA variables, organised by what a variable does
rather than which runtime owns it.
4. YAML parse errors quoted the offending source line — which in a credentials
document is the secret — into boot stderr and the watcher's logger. Only the
error code and position are reported now, in credentials-local and
settings-local alike, pinned by a test that asserts the secret is absent.
5. 0600 governed only files the harness wrote. A hand-created 0644 document was
read normally. POSIX now checks the mode before reading contents, at boot
and on every reload; Windows has no mode to inspect and is skipped rather
than faked.
The project a session is launched in is trusted by default, with no prompt and
no stored trust record: it may supply its own endpoint, ordinary variables, and
a key ranked below the managed store. Trust stops at the harness itself — a
discovered file still cannot set DSH_PERMISSION_MODE, PATH, BASH_ENV, or the
rest, because those take effect with no user action, before any turn, outside
the permission policy and the sandbox.
xjt