Adds a bilingual reference explaining how plugins are installed and composed
(bundles, patches, profiles, the Loader), how they are injected and activated
(Cordis inject/provide, fiber PENDING), and a dependency-derived split of the
shipped base bundle into system-required and freely optional plugins. Links the
plugin-inventory README to it and excludes the desktop build output from the
translation-pairing corpus scan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plugin-list tab rendered one flat list of every Loader entry — no separate
"system plugins" section — with each card showing its real enabled state and an
enable/disable button (a required plugin shows only a read-only note). The
enable/disable guard flipped from default-protect to default-open: only the
small REQUIRED_PLUGINS core (entry tree, Remote RPC spine, session/agent spines)
is protected from being disabled, so the shipped plugins are actually
toggleable. Tests, host READMEs, and the enable-disable agent note track the new
grouping and guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The plugin-list tab now splits by current state: disabled plugins sit in the
main list with an enable button (so a bundle-default-disabled plugin can be
re-enabled), while enabled plugins sit in the collapsible system section —
a user-added enabled plugin keeps a disable toggle, a required one shows
none. setEnabled refuses to disable a required plugin but allows re-enabling
a disabled one, verifying the fiber activates and reverting a
dependency-missing enable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
User-added (toggleable) plugins carry an enable/disable button in the main
list; required system plugins sit in a separate collapsible 'system plugins'
section with no controls. The system section starts expanded so the existing
web e2e/snapshot (which targets a system plugin row) still passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every entry now carries a protected flag. The guard is default-protect:
disabling a plugin another plugin injects breaks the dependent, and enabling
one whose service is unavailable fails the boot (dsh-tool-ralph: pending on
workflowEngine). setEnabled refuses and the UI hides the toggle for every
shipped plugin; only opt-in-bundle plugins (USER_TOGGLEABLE_PLUGINS in
required.ts) are toggleable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Update the plugin-inventory READMEs from read-only to toggleable and record
the in-page enable/disable capability as an Agent Note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Document the four image-recognition packages and the vision group, register
the vision domain in the package index, add the capability decision as an
Agent Note, declare the invariants peer dep, and drop the unused agents
injection from the consumer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the single DSH_CI_FAILOVER variable with two independent
switches so an outage on one platform no longer retargets the other:
- DSH_CI_FAILOVER_LINUX: the three required Linux workers (node-24,
node-24-coverage, node-24-consumers) and the all-checks-passed verdict,
which resolves its pool to vm-backup and keeps its concurrency and
cache-restore branches.
- DSH_CI_FAILOVER_WINDOWS: the non-blocking windows-native job, which
resolves to the dsh-win-ci pool.
all-checks-passed rides the Linux switch because it aggregates the
required Linux workers and runs on the vm-backup pool. The Dependabot
exclusion is preserved on both switches. The failover runbook (EN/ZH)
and its translation pairing, plus the docs that referenced the old
variable, are updated in the same change.
A landlock publication failed with `E409 Failed to save packument` on the
second of three packages. The registry answers a write it could not commit that
way, and publishing several packages back to back is what provokes it.
Neither publish path could recover. The native sequence published from a shell
loop of bare `npm publish` calls: no retry, and no way to resume, because the
registry rejects a repeat of an existing version permanently — so a failure
partway through left the release stuck. publish.ts skipped versions already
present, which made a re-run safe, but had no retry either.
Both paths now attempt a tarball up to four times, space writes at least two
seconds apart, and back off 2s/4s/8s between attempts. Every retry re-reads the
registry first, because a reported failure can answer a write that landed
anyway: a version that now exists with this tarball's integrity counts as
published rather than as one to place again. That same re-read is what turns a
mid-run `E403 cannot publish over the previously published versions` into a
skip when the bytes match, and leaves it a hard failure when they do not.
The native sequence gets the registry comparison publish.ts already had, through
its own script rather than shared code — the two sequences keep separate
publication paths. Its publish job now checks out the repository, which the
shell loop did not need.
Verified against a scripted registry: a clean publish, one E409 then success, an
E409 whose write landed anyway, E409 on every attempt (fails after four), and a
version already present with matching integrity (publishes nothing).
The three release sequences shipped with publishConfig.access: restricted, so
nothing in the @deepseek-ai scope was installable from outside the organization.
A restricted dependency is what actually blocks a public consumer: every harness
package declares the vendored framework as a peerDependency, and
dsh-sandbox-local declares the Landlock entry as a dependency. Those two
sequences therefore go public first — the nine vendor/* packages and the three
native/landlock-run packages — while the dsh family stays restricted until its
own sequence is opened deliberately. No public package requires a restricted one
in this arrangement.
Access is now per sequence, so no publish path can pass --access: one flag
cannot express two levels and would override the manifest that owns the fact.
publish.ts stops passing it, matching the native workflow, and
check-workspace-constraints holds each manifest to its own sequence's level,
which is what stops the scope from drifting one package at a time.
Harness consumers reference the Landlock entry as workspace:^ instead of
workspace:*, so a published harness package accepts the entry's patch and minor
releases. The entry keeps workspace:* for its platform packages, where the
binary must match the entry version exactly.
Two rationales that named a private registry no longer describe the vendored
sequence; they now state the durable reason, which is that the verification must
not depend on the registry already carrying matching versions.
The Codex and Claude Code subagent providers were production dependencies of
@deepseek-ai/dsh-base and mounted by its Cordis composition, so every install of
the base bundle carried two providers that only some products want.
Drop both from the base bundle's dependencies and composition. The examples keep
them as explicit dependencies, base's tests lock their absence, and the product
preset e2e mounts the providers it needs explicitly.
Cherry-picked from #2387 (two commits squashed into one).
pi-ai resolves an OAuth provider from a stored OAuth credential alone, and
this adapter builds its Models collection with no credential store and runs
no login flow. `openai-codex` — the one installed provider declaring
`auth.oauth` with no `auth.apiKey` — was therefore offered on the Models page
with the keyless placeholder every pi-ai route carries, and every request on
it failed `Provider is not configured` before going out.
`catalogProviderTakesApiKey()` answers whether pi-ai's installed provider for
a route declares the one method this adapter can supply, and the directory
skips the catalog routes that fail it. Catalog membership is unchanged, so
`declared` still answers what pi-ai ships; the profile half of the union stays
unconditional, so a route a settings document already names keeps its entry
and can be edited or deleted.
Resolution is untouched: a profile naming `apiKeyEnv` on such a route still
builds a working provider.
The shipped bundles keep ctx.sessionQuery mounted but set the new
session-query-sqlite `openAt: never` phase: searchSessions/searchEvents
fail with the typed SESSION_QUERY_SEARCH_DISABLED code before any request
normalization, node:sqlite is never imported or opened, and no source
observation or reconciliation runs. Every inherited exact read, filter,
and trace — session export descendants, subagent-fork Workspace
inheritance, title reads — keeps working, and the Web sidebar search
degrades to its designed local title/workspace matching. Enabling content
search is a one-line openAt override in a later patch layer; the web e2e
scaffold keeps it enabled as the assembled opt-in coverage.
Pine