deepseek-harness/docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-18-agent-lifecycle-and-ownership-seams.md

RFC: Agent lifecycle and ownership seams

Status: implemented

Problem

Several ACP and tool-bash limitations were symptoms of the same missing seam: plugins could create or resume agents through ctx.agents, but they could not own and dispose one agent independently, and long-running bash tasks carried no stable owner in the executor itself. ACP aborted and awaited agents on disconnect but could not unregister just that session's agent; session/cancel could not cancel queued-but-not-yet-started work; and tool-bash kept task ownership in a plugin-local Map, so an HMR reload could make an old task look unowned.

What was implemented

The three seams shipped across a stacked chain of PRs (the queue-aware cancel, the AgentHandle disposer, and the bash owner token), each converged independently.

1. Queue-aware Agent.cancel(reason?)

A new cancel() verb on the Agent interface — the single public stop primitive. (It originally shipped alongside a narrower step-only abort(); that verb was later removed as unused, leaving cancel() the only public way to stop work.) It clears the inbox's queued + steering FIFOs, aborts the in-flight step if any, and drives a turn-scoped cancellation marker the driver loop checks at every turn-decision point — so a prompt that is queued-but-not-yet-started never runs, a cancel landing in the pre-step / continuation window drops the about-to-run turn (ending it aborted), and a later prompt cannot be batched into the cancelled turn. whenIdle() reaches post-cancel quiescence. ACP session/cancel maps to cancel(). The marker is armed ONLY when there is something to cancel, so an idle no-op cancel cannot strand the next prompt.

2. AgentHandle async disposer

ctx.agents.create/resume (and the AgentFactory interface) return AgentHandle = { agent: Agent; dispose(): Promise<void> }. The disposer is a capability — only the holder can tear down exactly this agent: stop its loop, await the loop's exit (true quiescence, not just the disposed status flip), unregister it, and remove its session from the store. ctx.agents.get(id) still returns a bare Agent. Config-created agents stay owned by the AgentLoop fiber (the handle is discarded). ACP holds each session's disposer in its SessionRecord and runs it on disconnect/teardown, so a bare client disconnect leaves no registered agent and no session-store entry — even when session/load races teardown (the just-resumed handle is disposed before the closed-guard throw).

Teardown ORDER is load-bearing for durability, and the implementation folds the session lifecycle into the agent's SINGLE composite cordis effect (SessionStore.prepare/enter/announce, replacing a sibling-effect split). A fiber unload disposes sibling effects concurrently (Promise.all), which would race the session's onAppend detach against the loop's closing session/flush and drop the closing turn/end; inside one effect the disposers run as an ordered LIFO chain (loop stopped + await agent.done BEFORE the session detaches), so the loop's final flush is captured on BOTH the handle's dispose() and a fiber unload. The register disposer's agent/disposed emit is contained (a throwing listener must not reject the chain and skip the later session detach).

3. Bash owner token in the seam

Background-task ownership moved from a tool-bash plugin-local Map<string, Agent> into the executor. BashExecRequest gains an optional owner?: string; the resolved BashExecSpec carries it as required-but-nullable owner: string | undefined (a forgotten owner is a visible undefined, never a silently-absent property). The executor stores the token on its task and exposes it via a new BashExecutor.ownerOf(id): string | undefined seam (NOT on the public BashTask — one read path, no redundant API). tool-bash deletes its Map entirely: it stamps exec.agent?.session.header.id as the owner at start, and bash_output/bash_kill compare ctx.bash.ownerOf(id) to the caller's token with !== undefined semantics (an empty-string token is still a real owner). The completion notice finds the live agent by scanning ctx.get('agents')?.list() for agent.session.header.id === ownerToken (read via ctx.get — onTaskDone runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, where the ctx.agents proxy would throw). Because ownership now lives on the task in the executor (disposed with the dsh-bash fiber), it SURVIVES a tool-bash HMR reload — closing the old XXX(tool-bash-owner-hmr) gap. (The onTaskDone listener is still effect-scoped to tool-bash's apply, so a completion landing during the reload gap still drops its one notice — the pre-existing reload-gap drop — but the ownership fence itself is HMR-proof.)

Acceptance Criteria (met)

• ACP disconnect/session close leaves no registered agent AND no session-store entry for that session, even when session/load races teardown.
• session/cancel before a queued prompt starts prevents that prompt from running and cannot batch the next prompt into the cancelled turn.
• A tool-bash HMR reload does NOT make an existing background task readable or killable by a different session (ownership survives on the executor).
• Existing non-ACP demos still work without managing handles explicitly; config-created agents remain owned by the AgentLoop plugin fiber.

Seam precondition (recorded)

The bash owner-token comparison relies on session.header.id being unique among live agents. The agent registry does NOT enforce this — it rejects a duplicate agentId, not a duplicate session id, and createAgent accepts an arbitrary sessionId. This is NOT reachable via ACP (UUID sessionId, agentId === sessionId, duplicate-load rejected), so it is not a live product hole, but a programmatic caller that registers two agents with the same session id would break bash isolation and mis-route the completion notice. The access policy (token comparison) stays in tool-bash (the consumer); the bash seam stores only an opaque owner string and never interprets it — the correct interface/impl/consumer split.

The planned resolution is to remove the precondition by construction — see unify the agent id and the session id: once an agent IS its session (one id), the registry's existing unique-agentId check is a unique-session-id guarantee and no two live agents can share a session token.

Notes

This touched public interfaces (Agent, AgentFactory, the bash seam) deliberately, not as a local ACP patch. The simple synchronous Agent.send() ergonomics were preserved; the async lifecycle path is additive, for owners that need it.