kingwl
f505bd9258
Review fixes (ds-review-bot warnings on #623): - One chain, every consumer: the override resolution (own post-seed switches ?? header baseline, closed-vocabulary validated) moves into pure exports (sandboxOverrideOf / approvalOverrideOf); the services delegate, and the permission presets consume them — current(session) and set() now see inherited baselines, so a child inheriting danger-full-access gets REAL knob switches when workspace-write is selected instead of a silent no-op, and a seed-carried preset selection is subsumed by the baseline. current(events) becomes current(session) (pre-release; the only callers were tests). - Unconditional durable validation: a malformed header baseline fails loud on every read, no longer shadowed by an own switch. - The two policy peers are declared optional (peerDependenciesMeta), so a thin spawn/fork deployment without policy plugins can consume the driver; verify-runtime-closure honors the flag. Red-first: inherited-preset derive/switch-away and seeded-selection tests in the permission suite; malformed-baseline-with-own-switch tests in both policy suites.
64 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
5.1 KiB
Markdown
# @deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval
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English | [中文](README.zh.md)
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Channel-neutral one-shot approval seam. `ctx.approval.request(req)` returns `allowed-once`, `rejected`, `cancelled`, or `unavailable`; missing or failing answerers fail closed, and a grant applies only to the requested action. Exact event signatures live in the generated [Cordis catalog](../../../docs/cordis-catalog/events.md).
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Each request must belong to an open agent turn. The service appends a paired `approval/asked` and `approval/decided` audit record, while the model sees only the resulting logged tool outcome. An aborted request resolves `cancelled`; an audit append that fails before commit rejects rather than returning an unlogged decision.
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Answerers are `approval/request` waterfall listeners. Return an outcome to answer for an owned agent or call `next()` to delegate. Agent-scoped listeners receive only that agent's requests; compose one terminal answerer per deployment because sibling listener order is not a policy priority mechanism. The ACP automation bridge supplies one-shot machine decisions for sessions it owns.
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`ApprovalPolicy` is `'ask'` or `'never'`. The effective value is the last `approval/policy` event, falling back to config; `setApprovalPolicy()` is the write path. `'never'` rejects before interactive dispatch and is the only policy stated in the prompt. Switches produce at most one coalesced notice, attributed to the user when the override follows the last `request/header` and to operator/config otherwise. `ctx.approval.overrideOf(session)` (the pure `approvalOverrideOf` export, also consumed by the permission presets) resolves the session's override chain, never the configured default: the fold of the session's OWN switches (events past `SessionHeader.seedLength`), else the header's inherited `approvalPolicy` delegation baseline, validated against the closed vocabulary on read; the in-process subagent driver captures this at delegation and writes it into each child's creation-time header, so a `'never'` parent cannot mint prompting children, with no first-turn timing window ([rationale](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-25-subagent-policy-inheritance.md)).
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The tools pipeline routes `ask` decisions through this seam and fails closed when it is absent; the sandboxed bash tool also uses it for escalated retries. The ACP automation bridge answers calls for its own agents through the client's machine policy. Audit events remain log-only, so the model sees only the asking consumer's result. See the [approval-seam Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-approval-seam.md) and [sandbox Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-06-sandbox.md).
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## Model Experience
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### System prompt and policy notice
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#### What the model sees
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Under `ask`, every agent request carries the ask-policy prompt section below. Under `never`, it carries the never-policy prompt section below. A policy switch injects exactly `The approval policy changed from "<old>" to "<new>" (changed by the user).` or `The approval policy changed from "<old>" to "<new>" (changed by the operator/config).` before the next step.
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##### Ask-policy prompt section
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```markdown
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<!-- dsh-user-approval-policy:ask -->
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```
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##### Never-policy prompt section
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```markdown
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Approval prompts are disabled in this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically — do not request sandbox escalation (do not set `sandbox_permissions`).
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<!-- dsh-user-approval-policy:never -->
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```
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#### Token effect
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Small fixed per-request cost, larger under `never`; a change notice is conditional and retained in history.
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#### KV Cache effect
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Prefix-stable while the approval policy is unchanged. An `ask`/`never` switch changes the system-prompt section and invalidates reuse from its first changed token; the accompanying notice is append-only.
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### Tool outcome
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#### What the model sees
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`approval/asked` and `approval/decided` are log-only. The model sees only the asking consumer's eventual allowed, rejected, cancelled, or unavailable tool outcome; the human permission UI is not context.
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#### Token effect
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Zero duplicate audit tokens. A rejection may replace a normal tool result with a small retained error, while an allowance leaves the consumer's ordinary result.
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#### KV Cache effect
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Append-only; newly visible content follows the reusable request prefix and does not invalidate existing KV-cache entries.
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## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
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- **Requests are valid only inside an open turn** — an idle or between-turn caller throws before auditing; a durable out-of-turn approval workflow is deferred.
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- **Only one-shot grants exist** — the outcome vocabulary has `allowed-once` but no `allow-always`, remembered rule, revocation, or grant store; session policy is only `ask` / `never`.
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- **The request carries no tool arguments** — an answerer sees the tool name, reason, and optional call id; the ACP machine channel requires a call id and delegates requests without one.
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- **No built-in answerer** — headless or incompletely composed deployments resolve `unavailable` and fail closed; the service itself never prompts a human.
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